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OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS 
v. 




1. SUMMARY: Whether the DC erred in approving a ~ttleme~ t 
agreement. 
--7 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resp, Ann B. Zipes, 
individually and on behalf of a class, initiated this litigation 
in 1970 challenging the practice of resp TWA of terminating 
female flight attendants who became mothers. The DC entered a 
summary judgment in favor of all the class members. 
The CA upheld the summary judgment but found that 
approximately 92% of the plaintiffs' claims were jurisdictionally - - --.......__ -- --....._____ ------- ---- --·--
barred for failure of those plaintiffs to have filed timely 
-.... -- --
charges of discrimination with the EEOC within 90 days after the ------ --......___ - .........__ --.......___---
occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice. The DC 's .....___ -- - ·------- ~ 
order was vacated and the action remanded to the DC for further 
proceedings. The mandate of the CA, however, was stayed when 
both the plaintiff's class and TWA filed petitions for certiorari 
with this Court. On June 4, 1979, this Court granted a motion to 
defer consideration of the cert petitions pending completion of 
se tt lemen t negotiations in the DC. 
The resps arrived at a settlement, for which approval by the 
DC was required pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23{e). Under the 
terms of the settlement, women who' were discharged or had 




were reinstated in a ground position and served in that position 
within the 90 day period, are to receive a pro-rata share of $1.5 
million. ("Subclass A") Another $1.5 million is to be divided 
among the larger class who were discharged earlier -- the class 
whose claims the CA had found to be jurisdictionally barred. 
("Subclass B") All the women 
reemployment and full company 
conditions. 
affected would be offered j 
seniority, subject to certain 
Petr, the union representing current TWA personnel, was 
allowed to intervene to challenge the proposed settlement. The 
proposed settlement was estimated to create applications for 
t-- ~ '----
reemployment from 33 members of subclass A and 172 members of .,.......___ 
~ 
subclass B. TWA employs in excess of 6,000 flight attendants. 
Evidence was presented to indicate that in a single year the 
airline hires between 400 and 800 new flight attendants. 
The DC overruled petr's objection to its jurisdiction to 
consider the proposed settlement and approved the settlement. 
I 
Regarding jurisdiction, the DC reasoned that it was not bound by 
theCA's earlier ruling regarding the jurisdictional bar to the 
claims of subclass B because of the absence of the issuance of 
the mandate. The settlement was approved as "fair, reasonable 
and adequ~ for the parties and the subclasses." 
TheCA affirmed. TheCA rejected petr's contention that the 
DC lacked subject matter jurisdiction over t he claims of subclass 
B as a result of the CA's earlier decision. Petr had argued that 
once theCA had found subject matter jurisdiction to be lacking 
as to subclass B the DC could not approve a settlement granting 




any benefit to the members of subclass B. The CA noted that 
settlements are entered into because of the very uncertainties of 
the outcome in litigation as well as the avoidance of wasteful 
litigation and expense. The issue of the jurisdiction of the DC 
with regard to subclass B had not been finally determined because 
a challenge to the CA's earlier decision is still pending before 
the s. Ct. The compromise reflects the parties perception that 
the ultimate resolution of this issue could not be predicted with 
certainty because prior case law leaves the law in this matter 
open to question and the S. Ct. has not decided whether the time 
requirements for filing charges with the EEOC defines the court's 
subject matter jurisdiction (as the CA held) or should be treated 
as a statute of limitation in which case the doctrines of waiver 
and estoppel apply. The uncertainty of the outcome of this 
'-' issue was a major factor leading the parties to reach this 
settlement and the settlement was not an attempt to confer 
subject matter jurisdiction by consent. 
TheCA also rejected petr's contention that the DC should be 
reversed on the basis of McArthur v. Southern Airways, 569 F.2d 
276 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane). McArthur involved the DC 's 
approval of a settlement between Southern Airways and female 
flight attendants who alleged similar violations of Title VII. 
After the settlement approval, this Court decided United Airlines 
v. Evans which held that a discriminatory act which has not been 
made the basis for a timely charge has no legal consequences and 
does not create a continuing violation unless a present violation 
exists. Because no plaintiff in McArthur had made a timely 
- · .. , __.... 
- 5 -
c· filing with the EEOC nor were there continuing violations under 
the Evans standard, the CAS reversed the settlemen·t approval on 
( 
the ground that the DC had lacked jurisdiction over the action 
and therefore had no authority to approve the settlement. Here, 
the situation is different. In McArthur, there was found to be 
no subject matter jurisdiction at the time of approval of the 
settlement but the DC here clearly had jurisd iction over the 
claims of 8% of the plaintiff's class. In any event, theCA 
declined to adopt the McArthur rule. The principles favoring 
settlement of class action law suits remain t he same regardless 
of whether the disputed legal issues center on the jurisdiction 
of the court. Where the jurisdictional question is not settled 
with finality, parties should not be forced t o litigate the issue 
of jurisdiction if they can arrive at a settlement that is 
otherwise appropriate for DC approval. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr repeats its argument in this Court. 
Petr also argues that theCA's determination that McCarthur was 
distinguishable because the DC here had jurisdiction of the 
claims of subclass A conflicts with this Court's decision in 
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969} and Zahn v. International 
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973}. Those cases firmly establish 
that in any class action the court must have jurisdiction of the 
claim of each plaintiff. Additionally, the jurisdictional issues 
is clearly controlled by United Airlines v. Evans. 
7 
Petr also argues that the settlement wa s unreasonable and 1 
unfair. The burden for a grant of seniority falls squarely upon 
) . 





the burden falls disproportionately upon innoc ent incumbent 
employees who are asked to move over in favor of individuals who 
cannot prove violations of Title VII entitling them to any 
rightful place to which they should be allowe d to return. In 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), 
this Court said that granting seniority is an appropriate remedy 
absent unusual adverse impat upon incumbent employees not 
generally found in Title VII cases. Such adverse impact is 
present in this case. First, More than 400 flight attendants are 
presently and have been since at least Octob e r 1979, on lay-off. 
If and when positions reopen, these laid-off flight attendants 
will pit their seniority against that of returning plaintiffs 
(with a minimum of 10 years seniority) for such vacancies. 
( ' Second, many active employees likely will be forced to relocate 
to another city because of their loss of seniority. Third, the 
decision below grants seniority at the expense of other classes 
of employees themselves victims of TWA's pa s t discriminatory 
practices. Such groups include: (1) black f light attendants; 
(2) male flight attendants; (3) females denied employment by TWA 
because of motherhood; and (4) females who were forced to forego 
motherhood as a condition of continued employment. 
The resps have filed separate responses. They argue that 
where the issue of jurisdiction poses a bonafide question of law, 
a OC has the power to implement a settlement in which both sides 
compromise on that question. The CA 5 did not address this issue 
in McArthur and there is no conflict on this question between the 
circuits. Because the mandate of the CA wa s stayed, its opinion 
. ~ . 
- 7 -
( regarding jurisdiction did not present the DC from effectuating 
the parties compromised settlement. Petr never had standing to 
( :'\ 
prevent TWA from compromising on the legal question of 
jurisdiction. Petr's limited interest in the seniority question 
was fully and properly adjudicated. Moreover, the grant of 
seniority was clearly within the discretion of the DC. Petr 
failed to show any unusual adverse impact. 
4. DISCUSSION: Given that the mandate of the initial CA 
opinion was stayed, it would seem that a DC shoQ~have the 
authority to approve a settlement between the parties as long as 
contested issues remained. Arguably, this proposition should not 
change even though it is) very probable that part of the class 
which was to receive , relief would have been dismissed out of the 
case if the litigation had been allowed to p~oceed to its normal 
end. There is, however, a substantial unfairness about grantingat ~ ------- ( 
employees whoese claims are jurisdictionally barred seniority { 
the expense of the present employees. 
There is a conflict between the CA's decision and the 
decision of the CAS in McArthur but it is not as direct as petr 
makes it out to be. The resps point out that the plaintiffs in 
McArthur admitted that they had not complied with the Title VII 
time requirements. Their brief even conceded that they would 
not have brought the action if this Court's decision in Evans had 
been decided before they had filed it. Her e , compliance with the 
Title VII time limit remained in dispute at the time of the 
settlement and was one of the important issues that gave rise to 
the compromise. 
- 8 -
It should be noted that both resps have filed stipulations 
with the Clerk stating that if the present petition for 
certiorari is denied they will stipulate to the dismissal of the 
cross petitions in their pending cases in No. 78-1545 and No. 78-
1549. 
I recommend a denial of this petition as well as a denial in 
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Just ice Rehnquist 
Justice Stevens 
From: Nr. Justice Whito 
Circulated: J - ,.J. - £; 
Recirculated: __________ __ 
No. 78-1545, Zipes, et al. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. & 
No. 80-951, Indepe ndent Federation of Flight Att endants v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., et al. 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
Certiorari should be granted in this case to consider 
whether the timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the 
EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit, and, 
if so, whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
District Court's approval of the settlement of jurisdictionally 
barred claims. 
In 1970 Ann Zipes filed a Title VII class action challenging 
TWA's policy of terminating female flight flight attendants who 
became mothers. The District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff class, and the Court of Appeals upheld the 
summary judgment on the merits but concluded that approxima tely 
92% of the plaintiffs' claims were jurisdictional ly barred 
because those plaintiffs had not filed timely ch a rges of 
discrimination with the EEOC.l The Court of Appuals' mandate was 
!Plaintiffs argued that TWA had waived the timeliness 
defense by failing to plead it affirmatively in its answer. 
Ther e fore, the court consider ed wh e ther th e time period for 
f iling charges with the EEOC "i s in the na ture of a statute of 
limitations, in which case the doctrine of waiver and estoppel 
\ 
stayed pending petition for certiorari here.2 On June 4, 1979, 
we granted the parties' motion to defer consideration of the 
petitions for writ of certiorari pending completion of settlement 
proceedings. Meanwhile, the parties negotiated a settlement and 
sought the approval of the District Court, as required by Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). The settlement provided monetary 
. 
relief to those plaintiffs whose claims would not be 
jurisdictionally barred under the Court of Appeals' decision 
("Subclass A") and to those plaintiffs whose cla~ms would be 
jurisdictionally barred ("Subclass B"). All class members were 
offered reemployment and full company seniority, subject to 
certain conditions. The International Federation of Flight 
Attendants ("IFFA") intervened, representing TWA flight 
attendants who might be affected by the settlement agreement. 
would apply, or is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit 
case the employer could raise it at any time." 
Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 




The requirement that a timely charge be filed with the EEOC 
was contained in 42 u.s.c. §2000e-5 (d) (1970), later renumbered 
42 u.s.c. §2000e-5 (e) (1972). 
2Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari, No. 
78-1545, Zipes, et al. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., and TWA 
filed a conditional cross-petition, No. 78-1549, Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Zipes, et al. Plaintiffs argued that the 
t1mely filing of a charge is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
a Title VII suit. They noted that the Court had granted 
certiorari in Shell Oil Co. v. Dartt, 439 U.S. 99 (1977) to 
resolve the parallel issue under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, 29 u.s.c. §621 et ~., and had affirmed 
the judgment below by an equally divided court. The Court of 
Appeals had held that the ADEA's requirement that a timely notice 
of intent to sue be filed with the Secretary of Labor is subject 
to tolling and estoppel. Dartt v. Shell Oil Cc ., 539 F.2d 1256 
(CAlO 1976). 
The District Court approved the settlement and rejected IFFA's 
contention that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
claims of Subclass B, stating that it was not bound by the Court 
of Appeals' decision, since the court's mandate had been stayed. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that "the principles 
favoring settlement of class action lawsuits remain the same 
regardless of whether the disputed legal issues center on the 
jurisdiction of the court over the action" and noting that the 
disputed issue of whether Subclass B's claims weLe 
jurisdictionally barred had not been "settled with finality."3 
The court declined to follow McArthur v. Southern Airways, 569 
F·. 2d 276 {CAS 1978) {en bane), in which the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit reversed the approval of a settlement agreement 
in a Title VII class action, holding that the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction since no plaintiff had filed a timely charge 
of discrimination with the EEOC. IFFA now seeks review of the 
Court of Appeals decision, arguing that the District Court erred 
in approving the settlement of jurisdictionally barred claims.4 
Since the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held 
that the timely filing requirement is jurisdictional, it is 
difficult to reconcile the Court of Appeals' decision with the 
rule expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 {h) {3): 
3Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass' n , Local 550, et 
al. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al., 630 F.2d 1164, 1169 
(CA7 1980). 
4No. 80-951, Independent Federation of Flight At tend ants 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al. 
I'J'.,, 
I' 
"Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise 
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the 
court shall dismiss the action." Furthermore, the Court of 
Appeals' ruling that a District Court may approve the settlement 
of a jurisdictional issue conflicts with its own precedentS and 
with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision in 
McArthur, supra. 
This case would also enable the Court to decide whether 
subject matter jurisdiction in a Title VII action is dependent 
upon the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC. The Courts of 
Appeals have been struggling with this question,6 and we have 
referred to the filing requirement both as a "jurisdictional 
prerequisite"? and as serving the purpose of a statute of 
Ssee Patterson v. Stovall, S28 F.2d 108, 112, n. S (CA7 
1976) ("[T]he District Court would have [had] no authority to 
approve the settlement had it lacked jurisdiction"). 
6compare, Hart v. J.T. Baker Chemical Corp., S98 F.2d 
829, 831 (CA3 1979) (not a jurisdictional prereq,uisi te) and 
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., _ U.S. App. D.C. _, S67 
F.2d 429, 47S (1976) (same), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 1086 (1978), 
with In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airlines 
Cases, S82 F.2d 1142 (CA7 1978) (jurisdictional prerequisite). 
See Daughtrt v. King's Dept. Stores, Inc., 608 F.2d 906 (CAl 
1979); Srnit v. American President Lines, Ltd., S71 F.2d 102, 
108-109 (CA2 19 7 8) (expressly reserving the issue of whether the 
time limit for filing may be extended by equitable tolling or 
whether it is "strictly jurisdictional"). See also Chappell v. 
Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 129S (CAS 1979) (timely filing is 
a "Jurisdictional prerequisite," but is not juri s dictional in the 
same sense as is the amount in controversy requirement in 
diversity actions). 
?see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 41S u.s. 36, 47 
(1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 u.s. 792, 798 
(1973). 
limitations.8 
Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of certiorari 
in No. 78-1545 and No. 80-951. 
8rn Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC~, 432 U.S. 355, 
372 (1977), the Court referred --to the filing period as serving 
the purposes of a statute of limitations. In El ectrical workers 
y. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 u.s. 229 (1976), the Court referred 
to the filing period a s a "limitations period", 429 u.s. at 238-
'--- 244, and to the timely filing requirement as ;;_ "jurisdictional 
prerequisite." 429 u.s., at 240. 
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JusTICE WHITE. dissenting. 
Certiorari should be granted in this case to consider whether 
the timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit, and. if so, 
whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District 
Court's approval of the settlemeu t of jurisdictionally barred 
claims. 
In 1970 Ann Zipes filed a Title VII class action challenging 
TWA's policy of terminating female flight attendants who 
became mothers. The District Court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff class, and the Court of Appeals 
upheld the summary judgment on the merits but concluded 
that approximately 92% of the plaintiffs' claims were juris-
dictionally barred because those plaintiffs had not filed timely 
charges of discrimination with the EEOC.1 The Court of 
Appeals' mandate was stayed pending petition for certiorari 
1 Plaintiffs argued that TWA had waived the timeline:ss defense by flt.il-
ing to plead it affirmatively in its answer. Therefore, the court considered 
whether the time period for filing charges with the EEOC "is in the nature 
of a statute of limitations, in which case the doctrine of waiver and 
estoppel would apply, or is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in which 
ease the employer could raise it at. any time." In re Consolidated Pretrial 
Pmceedings in the Ai·rline Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142 (CA7 1978). 
The requirement that a timely charge be filed with the EEOC was con-
tained in 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5 (d) (1970), later renumbered 42 U.S. C. 
§ 2000e-5 (e) (1972). 
I • 
' ·" 
ZIPES v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
here.z On June 4, 1979, we granted the parties' motion to 
defer consideration of the petitions for writ of certiorari 
pending completion of settlement proceedings. Meanwhile, 
the parties negotiated a settlement and sought the approval 
of the District Court, as required by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 (e). The settlement provided monetary relief 
to those plaintiffs whose claims would not be jurisdictionally 
barred under the Court of Appeals' decision ("Subclass A") 
and to those plaintiffs whose claims would be jurisdictionally 
barred ("Subclass B"). All class members were offered re-
employment and full company seniority, subject to certain 
eonditions. The International Federation of Flight Attend-
ants ("IFFA") intervened, representing TWA flight attend-
ants who might be affected by the settlement agreement. 
The District Court approved the settlement and rejected 
IFF A's contention that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over the claims of Subclass B, stating that it was not bound 
by the Court of Appeals' decision, since the court's mandate 
had been stayed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning 
that "the principles favoring settlement of class action law-
suits remain the same regardless of whether the disputed 
legal issues center on the jurisdiction of the court over the 
action" and noting that the disputed issue of whether Sub-
class B's claims were jurisdictionally barred had not been 
"settled with finality."~ The court declined to follow 
1 Plaintiff:; filed a petition for writ of certiorari, No. 78-1545, Zipes, et al . 
v. 'l'rans World Airlines, Inc. , and TWA filed a conditional cross-petition, 
No. 78-1549, Trans World Airlines, hu;. v. Zipes, et al. Plaintiffs argued 
that the timely filing of a charge i:s not a jurilldict.ional prerequi:site to a 
Title VII suit. They note that the CoUii had granted certiorari in Shell 
Oil Co. v. Dartt, 43l U. S. 99 ( 1977) to resolve the parallel issue under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. § 621 
1t seq., and had affirmed the judgment below by an equally divided court. 
The Court of Appeab had held that. the ADEA's requirement that a 
timely notice of intent to sue be filed with the Secretary of Labor is sub-
ject to tolling and estoppel. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. 2d 1256 
(CAlO 1976). 
• Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Assn., Local 550, et al. v. Tr-an'8 
'World Airlines, Inc ., et al., 630 F. 2d 1164, 1169 (CA7 1980). 
ZIPES v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
McArthur v. Southern Airways, 569 F. 2d 276 (CA5 1978) 
(en bane), in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir~ 
cuit reversed the approval of a settlement agreement in a 
Title VII class action, holding that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction since no plaintiff had filed a timely charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC. IFF A now seeks review of 
the Court of Appeals decision, arguing that the District 
Court erred in approving the settlement of jurisdictionally 
barred claims! 
Since the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
held that the timely filing requirement is jurisdictional, it 
is difficult to reconcile the Court of Appeals' decision with 
the rule expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (h) 
(3): "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or 
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, the court shall dismiss the action." Furthermore, 
the Court of Appeals' ruling that a District Court may ap- ..-e._ 
prove the settlement of a jurisdicti01f issue conflicts with its 
own precedent 5 and with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit's decision in McArthur, supra. · 
This case would also enable the Court to decide whether 
~;ubject matter jurisdiction in a Title VII action is dependent 
upon the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC. The 
Courts of Appeals have been struggling with this question,6 
4 No. 80-851, Independent Pedemtion of Plight Attendants v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. , et al . 
1 See Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F. 2d 108, 112, n. 5 (CA7 1976) ("[T]he 
Di~trict Court would have !'IJadJ no authority to approve the settlement 
had it lacked jurisdiction") . 
• Compare, Hart v. J. '1'. Baker Chemical Corp ., 598 F . 2d 829, 831 
(CA3 1979) (not a jurisdiction prerequi::;ite) and Laffey v. Northwest Air-
lines, Iuc .,- U. S. App. D. C. - , 567 F . 2d 429, 475 (1976) (same), 
eert. denied, 434 U. S. 1086 (1978), with In reConsolidated Pretrial Pro-
ceedings in the Airlines Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142 (CA7 1978) (jurisdictio-nal 
prerequisite) . See Daughtry v. King's Dept . Stor·es, Inc., 608 F. 2d 906 
(CAl 1979); Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F. 2d 102, 
108-109 (CA2 1978) ( expres::;ly reserving the is:,ue of whether the time 
limit for filing may be e~tencled by equitable tolling or whether it is 
"strictly jurisdictional") . See also Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co.,. 
-ZJPES t•. THANS WOHLJ> AlHLl~f<~\ Il'\C. 
aud we havf> referred to the filing rt>quirement both as a 
"jurisdictional prerequisite"' and as serving the purpose of 
a statute of limitations." 
Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of Cf>rtiorari in No. 
78-1545 and No. R0- 951. 
601 F. :!d 1:295 (C'A5 1979) (tinwl~· filin~ i,.: a "juri~uictiunal pr("rP(jui~ite," 
but i:; nut juri~dictiunal in the ~a me :>t:>n,.:e a~ i::; t lw amount in euntruven:,~· 
requirrml'nt in din·r~ity actiunH). 
7 SeP Ale.cander " · Oard'ller-Denver C'o. , 415 ( I S. 3(\, -!7 (HJ74); 
McDonnell Doug/a.~ ('orp . v. Ureen . ~11 11. H. i!~:!, iH>- (Hii;~) . 
8 In Or·ridental Life fr1suraJH'P Co. \'. El<JOC' , ~;{:! ('. S. :355, :37:! (1H77), 
the Court rPfl·rrPu to rhe filinl! period a>< "erving t hr purpo,.:e,.: uf H statute 
of limitations. In El~:ctrical Worker8 ' . RubbinN & 111uer8, Inc .. -!:W 0. S. 
229 (1976), tlw Court referred to tlw filin~ period as a "limitation,; pe-
riod," -!29 11. S., at :!;{K-:!4-!, and to tlw tinu-ly filiug re<.juireruent u.s a 
"jurisdil'tiunal prf' requi><ite.'' ~29 U. S., at 2-!0. 
~ ·. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATFB ----
ANNE B. ZIPES ET AL. v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, 
INC., and INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF 
FLIGHT ATTENDANTS v. TRANS WORLD 
AIRLINES, INC., ET AL. 
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Nos. 78-1545 and 80-951. Decided March -, 1981 
JusTICE WHITE, with whom JusTICE PowELL and JusTICE ' 
REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
Certiorari should be granted in this case to consider whether 
the timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit, and, if so, 
whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District 
Court's approval of the settlement of jurisdictionally barred 
claims. 
In 1970 Ann Zipes filed a Title VII class action challenging 
TWA's policy of terminating female flight attendants who 
became mothers. The District Court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff class, and the Court of Appeals 
upheld the summary judgment on the merits but concluded 
that approximately 92% of the plaintiffs' claims were juris-
dictionally barred because those plaintiffs had not filed timely 
charges of discrimination with the EEOC.1 The Court of 
Appeals' mandate was stayed pending petition for certiorari 
1 Plaintiffs argued that TWA had waived the timeliness defense by fail-
ing to plead it aflirmatively in its answer. Therefore, the court considered 
whether the time period for filing charges with the EEOC "is in the nature 
of a statute of limitations in which case the doctrines of waiver and 
estoppel would- apply, or is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in which 
case the employer could raise it at any time." In re C011solidated Pretrial 
P1'oceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142, 1151 (CA7 1978). 
The requirement that a timely charge be filed with the EEOC was con-
tained in 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (d) (1970), later renumbered 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-5 (e) (1972). 
2 ZIPES v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
here.~ On June 4, 1979, we granted the parties' motion to 
defer consideration of the petitions for writ of certiorari 
pending completion of settlement proceedings. Meanwhile, 
the parties negotiated a settlement and sought the approval 
of the District Court, as required by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 (e). The settlement provided monetary relief 
to those plaintiffs whose claims would not be jurisdictionally 
barred under the Court of Appeals' decision ("Subclass A") 
and to those plaintiffs whose claims would be jurisdictionally 
barred ("Subclass B"). All class members were offered re-
employment and full company seniority, subject to certai11 
conditions. The International Federation of Flight Attend-
ants ("IFF A") intervened, representing 1'WA flight attend-
ants who might be affected by the settlement agreement. 
The District Court approved the ~ettlement and rejected 
IFF A's contention that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over the claims of Subclass B, stating that it was not bound 
by the Court of Appeals' decisioh, since the court's mandate 
had been stayed. The Court of Apqeals affirmed, reasoning 
that "the principles favoring settlement of class action law-
suits remain the same regardless of whether the disputed 
legal issues center on the jurisdiction of the court over the 
action" and noting that the disputed issue of whether Sub-
class B's claims were jurisdictionally barred had not been 
"settled with finality." 3 The court declined to follow 
2 Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari, No. 78-1545, Zipes, et al. 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , and TWA filed a conditional cross-petition, 
No. 78-1549, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Zipes, et al. Plaintiffs argued 
that the timely filing of a charge i~ not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a 
Title VII suit. They noted that the Court had granted certiorari in Shell 
Oil Co. v. Dartt, 434 U. S. 99 (1977) to re.solvE> the parallel issue undE>r 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. § 621 
et seq., and had affirmed the judgment below by an equally divided court. 
The Court of Appeals ha.cl held that the ADEA's requirement that a 
timely notice of intent to sue be filed with the Secretary of Labor is sub-
ject to tolling and estpppel. Dartt v. She~ Oil Co., 539 F. 2d 1256 
(CAIO 1976). 
3 Air Line Stewards and Stewardessel! Assn., Local 550, et ul . v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. , et al., 630 F. 2d 1164, 1169 (CA7 1980). 
ZIPES v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 3 
McArthur v. Southern Airways, 569 F. 2d 276 (CA5 1978) 
(en bane), in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed the approval of a settlement agreement in a 
Title VII class action, holding that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction since no plaintiff had filed a timely charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC. IFF A now seeks review of 
the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that the ·District 
Court erred in approving the settlement of jurisdictionally 
barred claims. • 
Since the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
held that the timely filing requirement is jurisdictional, it 
is difficult to reconcile the Court of Appeals' decision with 
the rule expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (h) 
(3): "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or 
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, the court shall dismiss the action." Furthermore, 
the Court of Appeals' ruling that a District Court may ap-
prove the settlement of a jurisdictional iEsue conflicts with its 
own precedent~ and with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit's decision in McArthur, supra. 
This case would also enable the Court to decide whether 
subject matter jurisdiction in a Title VII action is dependent 
upon the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC. The 
Courts of Appeals have been struggling with this question,6 
4 No 80-951, Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. 'l'rans 
World Airlines, Inc. , et al. 
5 See Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F. 2d 108, 112, n. 5 (CA7 1976) ("[T]he 
District Court would have [had] no authority to approve the ~ettlement 
had it lacked jurisdiction") . 
6 Compare, Hart v. J. T . Baker Chemical Corp, 598 F. 2d 829, 831 
(CA3 1979) (not a jurisdictional prerequisite) and Lrrffey v. Northwest 
Airlines, Inc ., - U. S. App. D. C. -, -, 567 F. 2d 429, 475 (1967) 
(same), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1086 (1978), with In re Consolidated Pre-
trial Proceedings in the Airlines Cases. 582 F. 2d 1142, 1151 (CA7 1978) 
(jurisdictional prerequisite). See Daughtry v. King's De11t . Stores, Inc., 
608 F. 2d 906, 909 (CAl 1979); Smith v. Am~rican President Lines, Ltd., 
571 F. 2d 102, 108-109 (CA2 1978) (expreo~ly reserving the issue of 
whether the time limit for filing may be extended by equitable tolling or 
wheth~r it is "strictly juri~dictional") . See tll~o Chappell v. Emco M a;h. 
.• . ... . ,.... .. .. .. ····· 
,, . 
4 ZIPES v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
and we have referred to the filing requirement both as a 
"jurisdictional prerequisite" 7 and as serving the purpose of 
a statute of limitations.8 
Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of certiorari in No. 
78-1545 and No. 80-951. 
Works Co., 601 F. 2d 1295, 1298 (CA5 1979) (timely filing is a "jur:Sdic-
tional prerequisite," but is not jurisdictional in the same sense as is the 
amount in controversy requirement in diversity action;;). 
7 See Alexande1· v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 47 (1974); 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798 (1973). 
8 In Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 372 (1977), 
the Court referred to the filing period as serving the purposes of a statute 
of limitations. In Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 42.g U. S. 
229 ( 1976), the Court referred to the filing period as a "limitations pe-
riod," 429 U. S., at 23&-244, and to the timely filing requirement as a 
"jurisdictional prerequisite." 429 U. S., at 240. 
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CH AMBERS OF 
J USTICE B Y RON R . WHIT E 
May 11, 1981 
Memorandum to the Conference 
Re: Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, et al. 
TWA's Motion to Limit the Grant in No. 80-951 
and to Dismiss Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 as Moot 
I. SUMMARY 
We granted certiorari in No. 80-951 on March 9, 1981. The 
primary issues presented by petitioner are (1) whether the 
timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit, and, if so, (2) 
whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District 
Court's approval of the settlement of jurisdictionally barred 
claims. Petitioner is the Independent Federation of Flight 
Attendants (IFFA), representing TWA flight attendants who would 
be adversely affected by the grant of competitive seniority to 
plaintiffs who are re-employed as flight attendants pursuant to 
the settlement agreement. Respondents are TWA and the plaintiff 
-2-
IFFA challenges two separate orders entered by the DC. In 
one order the DC approved the settlement agreement; in the other 
it awarded competitive seniority to reinstated plaintiffs. TWA 
moves the Court to limit its review to the order awarding 
competitive seniority. 
When we granted certiorari in No. 80-951, we also granted 
certioriari in two other petitions filed earlier in this 
litigation, which we had held pending resolution of settlement 
proceedings. Those petitions seek review of a prior CA decision 
in this case. In No. 78-1545, plaintiff class contends that the 
timely filing of EEOC charges is not a jurisdictional 
prerequisite. In No. 78-1549, TWA contends (a) that the CA 
erred in affirming summary judgment 'for plaintiffs on the issue 
of liability, (b) that TWA should only be required to grant 
plaintiffs prospective relief, and (c) that the CA erred in 
defining the subclass of plaintiffs who had filed timely charges 
with the EEOC. 
TWA asks the Court to dismiss No. 78-1545 and No. 78-1549 
as moot if the Court limits its review to the order awarding 
competitive seniority. 
The plaintiff class asks the Court to (a) grant TWA's 
motion; or (b) order the parties to stipulate to the dismissal 
.• 
-3-
of Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549; or (c) dismiss Nos. 78-1545 and 78-
1549 as moot. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs are women who lost their jobs as TWA flight 
attendants because of TWA's policy (prior to 1970) of requiring 
flight attendants who became mothers to resign or accept ground 
duty positions.! Plaintiffs filed a Title VII class action 
challenging this policy. 
A. DC's 1976 Orders: In October 1976, the DC granted 
summary judgment on the issue of liability and rejected TWA's 
contention that certain members of the plaintiff class had not 
filed timely charges with the EEOC. The DC held that the timely 
filing requirement is jurisdictional. However, a continuing 
violation of plaintiffs' rights existed until TWA changed its 
policy and permitted the rehiring of flight attendants who had 
become mothers. Thus, all plaintiffs had met the timely filing 
requirement. 
B. CA's 1978 Decision: The CA affirmed the DC's ruling on 
lTwA did not impose similar restrictions on male cabin 
attendants who became fathers. See note 17, infra • 
-4-
liability and vacated the DC's ruling on the timely filing 
issue. It held that the timely filing requirement is 
jurisdictional and that the claims of certain class members 
(labelled "Subclass B") were jurisdictionally barred. The CA 
concluded that all members of the plaintiff class who were 
permanently terminated during the 90 days preceding the filing 
of EEOC charges and all members who were reinstated in ground 
duty positions after their maternity leave and continued their 
employment into the 90-day period preceding the filing of EEOC 
charges had met the timely filing requirement. (These 
plaintiffs were labelled "Subclass A.") The CA reasoned that 
the reinstated employees had been subjected to a continuing 
violation of Title VII. 582 F.2d at 1149-1150.2 
C. Cert Petition No. 78-1545: The plaintiff class (on 
behalf of Subclass B) filed a cert petition, No. 78-1545, 
seeking review of the CA's decision. The only issue presented 
in that petition is whether the timely filing requirement is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite and therefore is not subject to the 
doctrines of waiver and estoppel.3 
2see note 17, infra. 
3The CA had rejected plaintiffs' contentions that TWA 
waived the timely filing defense by failing to raise it in the 
-5-
D. Conditional Cross-petition No. 78-1549: TWA filed a 
conditional cross-petition, No. 78-1549, arguing: (a) summary 
judgment on the issue of liability was improper; (b) if there 
was a Title VII violation, the remedies should be prospective 
only; and (c) the CA erred in defining Subclass A.4 
E. Motion to Defer Consideration: The parties asked the 
Court to defer consideration of these cert petitions pending 
completion of settlement proceedings. Their motion was granted 
on June 4, 1979. 
F. Settlement Agreement: TWA and the plaintiff class 
negotiated a settlement that provided monetary relief to all 
class members (Subclass A and Subclass B) 5 and required TWA to 
re-employ as flight attendants all class members who were ready, 
willing and qualified to p~rform the job. The settlement 
agreement also provided: 
answer to the complaint and that TWA was estopped from relying 
on this defense because TWA raised the issue so late in the 
proceedings. 
4see note 17, infra. 
5Members of Subclass A were awarded substantially more 
monetary compensation than members of Subclass B. The 
settlement agreement adopted the CA's definition of Subclasses A 
and B. 
-6-
"All re-employed class members shall have, be 
credited with and enjoy the amount of seniority 
and credit for length of service as is provided 
in Section V hereof." 
Section V(A) dealt with company seniority. Section V(B) 
provided: 
"It is agreed that the total amount of seniority 
and credit for length of service (both accrued 
and retroactive) for the compensation period 
will be determined by the Court in its 
discretion, pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 706(g), and all other applicable 
provisions of law, without contest or objection 
by TWA. II 
The settlement agreement also stated: 
"Nothing contained in any other agreement or 
writing and no right or obligation which has 
arisen or accrued outside of this Settlement 
Agreement (including prior, current and future 
labor agreements) shall be deemed to modify, 
change or diminish the rights and obligations 
which arise under this Agreement." (emphasis 
added) 
The parties agreed that the settlement would be submitted to the 
DC for approval and that "[t] he parties shall jointly file in 
the United States Supreme Court a motion and stipulation asking 
that the current pending petitions for writs of certiorari be 
held in abeyance during the settlement procedures, to be 
dismissed immediately after the Final Order Date." The term 
'-$<, ' 
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"Final Order Date" was defined as "the date on which the order 
described in Section X becomes final and no longer subject to 
court review." The order described in Section X was "an order 
which approves this Settlement Agreement and dismisses these 
cases against TWA." 
G. DC's 1979 Orders: The parties sought the DC's approval 
of the settlement, as required by F.R.C.P. 23(e) .6 IFFA 
intervened, asserting that the DC lacked jurisdiction over the 
claims of Subclass B and therefore was without authority to 
approve that part of the settlement agreement that allowed for 
an award of competitive seniority to members of Subclass B. The 
DC held that the CA's 1978 decision did not bar it "from 
exercising its authority over those portions of the proposed 
settlement agreement pertaining to members of Subclass B." It 
emphasized that the CA had stayed its mandate with respect to 
the jurisdictional issue pending final disposition of cert 
6F.R.C.P. 23(e) provides: 
"A class action shall not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the court, 
and notice of the proposed dismissal or 
compromise shall be given to all members of the 
class in such manner as the court directs." 
-8-
petition No. 78-1545. 
1. "Order Approving Settlement and Dismissing Actions": 
The DC subsequently entered an order approving the settlement 
' l'"' 
agreement and dismissing the action. 7 The DC retained 
jurisdiction (a) to determine the total amount of seniority and 
credit for length of service for re-employed class members as 
provided in Section V (B) of the Settlement Agreement; (b) to 
enforce the terms of the settlement agreement and to adjudicate 
any disputes over the interpretation of the settlement 
agreement; and (c) to award costs and attorneys' fees. 
2. "Order Awarding Seniority": On the same day, the DC 
entered a separate order, stating that "full restoration of 
retroactive seniority will not have an unusual adverse impact 
upon currently employed flight attendants in a manner which is 
not typical of other Title VI I cases," and ordering that each 
re-employed class member be granted full retroactive competitive 






found that proper notice of the proposed 
been given to class members, that no class member 
to the settlement, and that the settlement 
"fair, reasonable, and adequate for the parties 
A and B." 
-9-
and (c) above.8 
H. CA's 1980 Decision: IFFA appealed from both orders, and 
the CA affirmed the DC' s approval of the settlement agreement 
and its award of retroactive seniority. The CA rejected IFFA's 
contention that, with respect to the claims of Subclass B, the 
parties had conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the DC by 
consent. "We think the principles favoring settlement of class 
action lawsuits remain the same regardless of whether the 
disputed legal issues center on the jurisdiction of the court 
over the action. Where, as here, the jurisdictional question is 
not settled with finality, parties should not be forced to 
litigate the issue of jurisdiction if they can arrive at a 
settlement that is otherwise appropriate for district court 
approval." 630 F.2d, at 1169. TheCA ruled that the DC had not 
abused its discretion in approving the settlement and granting 
retraoctive competitive seniority. 
I. Cert Petition No. 80-951: IFFA filed a cert petition, 
No. 80-951, arguing: (1) The DC lacked subject matter 
8with respect to each order the DC made a finding, 
pursuant to F.R.C.P. 54(b) that "no just reason exists to delay 
enforcement of or appeal from this Order." 
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jurisdiction over the claims of Subclass B and therefore could 
not (a} approve settlement of those claims; (b) order that those 
employees be awarded competitive seniority; or (c) order that 
the provisions of the settlement would supersede the collective 
bargaining agreement between TWA and IFFA. (2} The DC did not 
make a finding, pursuant to 42 u.s.c. §2000e-5(g}, that TWA had 
violated Title VII as to Subclass B members.9 Therefore, the DC 
942 u.s.c. §2000e-5(g} provides in part: 
"If the court finds that the respondent has 
intentionally engaged in or is intentionally 
engaging in an unlawful employment practice 
charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin 
the respondent from engaging in such unlawful 
employment practice, and order such affirmative 
action as may be appropriate, which may include, 
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring 
or employees ••• or any other equitable relief 
as the court deems appropriate." (emphasis 
added}. 
IFFA contends that "as to Subclass B, a violation has 
neither been admitted nor proven." Cert Petn, at 19. Although 
IFFA suggests that "plaintiffs who settle" have not established 
that a Title VII violation occurred, IFFA states that its 
argument only applies to Subclass B. Ibid., n. 15. IFFA 
contends that there clearly was no "finding" with respect to 
Subclass B, since the CA held in 1978 that Subclass B's claims 
were jurisdictionally barred. "At the time of settlement, the 
only finding in effect as to the claims of Sub-Class B was that 
they are barred by the failure to comply with the jurisdictional 
time limits." Ibid. 
-11-
was not empowered to grant them full retroactive seniority or to 
approve a settlement agreement superseding the terms of the 
collective bargaining agreement. (3) An award of competitive 
seniority was inappropriate, since it had an unusually adverse 
impact on incumbent employees. 
III. MOTIONS FILED BY TWA AND THE PLAINTIFF CLASS 
A. TWA's Motion: Rather than asking the Court to limit the 
grant in No. 80-951 to particular questions raised in the cert 
petition, TWA moves the Court to limit review to the order of 
the DC entitled "Order Awarding Seniority." As TWA construes 
the settlement agreement, TWA and the plaintiff class have 
agreed that as soon as the separate "Order Approving Settlement" 
is no longer subject to judicial review, they must move this 
Court to dismiss their cert petitions (Nos. 78-1545 and 78-
1549). TWA contends that if the Court limits its review to the 
"Order Awarding Seniority," it should then treat the petitions 
in Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 as moot and direct their 
dismissa1.10 If the grant is not so limited, consideration of 
lOTWA points out that when litigation in the federal 
courts is settled after a petition for certiorari has been 
filed, this Court vacates the CA's judgment and directs that the 
case be dismissed as moot. See, e.g., J. Aron & Co. v. 
-12-
those petitions should be deferred.ll 
TWA asserts that "review of the seniority order alone will 
adequately protect the interests of the currently employed 
flight attendants whom the union solely represents" and that 
"the issues raised by the union against the settlement order 
could continue to be considered in review of the seniority 
order." According to TWA, IFFA cannot object to the Order 
Approving Settlement, since it merely provided that the DC would 
decide the issue of competitive seniority pursuant to §706 (g) 
and "all other applicable provisions of law." TWA urges the 
Court to limit the grant to review of the Order Awarding 
Seniority so that "[t]he parties to the litigation would be 
permitted to make a valid settlement regardless of the possible 
lack of jurisdiction over the claims settled." TWA Motion, p. 
9. 
B. The Plaintiff Class's Motion: The plaintiff class does 
Mississippi Shipping Co., 361 u.s. 115 (1959). 
ll"The reasons for holding up consideration of the 
petitions in Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 continue to exist until 
this Court issues an order on the union's appeal from the 
settlement order in No. 80-951." TWA's Motion, p. 3. I do not 
read this as a motion to defer and do not treat it as such . 
. '' 
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not object to TWA's motion. Plaintiffs move the Court to (a) 
grant TWA's motion, or (b) order TWA and the plaintiff class to 
stipulate to the dismissal of Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549, or (c) 
dismiss Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 as moot. Plaintiffs argue that 
there is no longer a case or controversy between them and TWA, 
since they have entered into a settlement. They also contend 
that IFFA does not have standing to object to the Order 
Approving Settlement, for IFFA merely objects to that order as 
"the underpinning to the order which granted competitive 
seniority." Plaintiffs' Response, p. 3. The settlement 
agreement merely recognized that competitive seniority would be 
determined by the DC in an adversarial proceeding in which IFFA 
could participate. Therefore, the Order Approving Settlement is 
no longer subject to judicial review and TWA is currently 
obligated by the settlement agreement to stipulate to the 
dismissal of the pending cert petitions. Plaintiffs ask the 
Court to order them and TWA to stipulate to the dismissal of 
Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549. 
Plaintiffs assert that even if this Court were to hold that 
the DC lacked jurisdiction over the claims of Subclass B, the 
settlement agreement would still be binding, "for the simple 
reason that the pivotal issue of whether the timely filing of an 
' . 
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EEOC charge affects jurisdiction has 
compromised." Plaintiffs' Response, p. 4. 
been settled and 
c. IFFA's Response: IFFA takes no position on the proper 
disposition of Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 but objects to a 
limitation of the grant in No. 80-951. IFFA agrees that its 
interest in the case is the grant of retroactive competitive 
seniority to the plaintiff class. However, that interest is 
affected by the Order Approving Settlement as well as by the 
Order Awarding Seniority. IFFA continues to object to the 
following provisions in the Order Approving Settlement: (a) the 
provision that the agreement supersedes prior, current and 
future labor agreements; (b) the provising stating that the DC 
will retain jurisdiction to enforce and interpret the settlement 
agreement; and (c) the provision stating that the DC will decide 
the issue of competitive seniority [with respect to Subclass B]. 
IFFA asserts that although TWA and plaintiffs were free to 
enter into an out-of-court settlement, they could not confer 
jurisdiction on the DC to approve their agreement to compromise 
the jurisdictional dispute. 
D. The Plaintiff Class's Supplemental Response: Plaintiffs 
disagree with TWA's position that the Order Approving Settlement 
will only be final if the Court grants TWA's motion. IFFA may 




not obtain review of the Order Approving Settlement, since the 
provisions in the settlement agreement that IFFA objects to are 
meaningless. "Each provision recites a matter that by operation 
of law would exist even in the absence of the provision." IFFA 
would not be harmed if the Court only reviewed the Order 
Approving Settlement, for IFFA could raise the same arguments 
and could obtain the same relief if it only challenged the Order 
Awarding Seniority. 
IV. RECOMMENDATION 
A. TWA's and the Plaintiffs' Motions: I recommend that 
these motions be denied. 
1. May IFFA Challenge the Order Approving Settlement? 
In my view, IFFA has standing to challenge this order. If the 
DC had not approved that portion of the settlement agreement 
that provided for the re-employment of Subclass B members, there 
would have been no award of competitive seniority to those 
individuals. The settlement agreement expressly authorizes the 
DC to determine the appropriate amount of competitive seniority 
to be awarded to re-employed plaintiffs. The plaintiff class 
admits that the settlement agreement is "the underpinning to the 




2. If the Court Does Not Limit Its Review to the Order 
Awarding Seniority, Should It Direct the Dismissal of Nos. 78-
1545 & 78-1549? No. The parties are free to stipulate to the 
dismissal of these petitions pursuant to Rule 53. However, they 
have not chosen to do so. The parties are not willing to agree 
to the dismissal of these petitions until the settlement 
agreement is final. 
Plaintiffs move the Court to direct the dismissal of Nos. 
78-1545 and 78-1549 on the ground that the Order Approving 
Settlement is no longer subject to judicial review. · Since I 
believe IFFA is entitled to challenge the Order Approving 
Settlement, I would deny this motion. 
Assuming that the Order Approving Settlement is not yet 
final, I do not think Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 can be dismissed 
as moot. If the settlement were to fall through, TWA and the 
plaintiff class could litigate the issues presented in those 
petitions.l2 
B. Limitation of the Grant in No. 80-951 & Deferral of No. 
12As discussed below, if No. 78-1545 does not become moot, 
the Court will already have ruled in No. 80-951 that the timely 
filing requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite. 
. "' 
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78-1549: I suggest limiting the grant in No. 80-951 to 
eliminate question #3.13 I believe question #2 in many respects 
merges into question #1.14 Thus, in No. 80-951 the Court would 
be left with the two major issues the Court granted certiorari 
to address. 
If the Court were to decide (a) that the timely filing 
requirement is not jurisdictional or (b) that although the 
timely filing requirement is jurisdictional, the DC was entitled 
to approve the settlement of that issue, then the settlement 
would be approved. Nos. 78-1545 and 78-1549 would be dismissed 
as moot, and the CA's 1978 decision could then be vacated. 
If the Court were to decide (c) that the timely filing 
requirement is jurisdictional and that the DC lacked 
13The issue of whether the order awarding competitive 
seniority had an unsually adverse impact on incumbent employees 
relates only to the facts of this case. Furthermore, there is 
no analysis of this issue in the DC's order or the CA's opinion. 
14As discussed above, see note 9, IFFA' s arguments 
regarding the need for a "finding" of a Title VII violation 
ultimately focus on whether or not the claims of Subclass B are 
jurisdictionally barred. TWA recognizes this, stating that 
"Point II of the union's petition, attacking the seniority 
allowance for lack of a finding of a violation of Title VII, 
means that a violation was not established because there was no 
jurisdiction." TWA's Motion, at 9. 
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jurisdiction to approve the settlement of the claims of Subclass 
B, then either the entire settlement would fall through or the 
settlement of Subclass B's claims would fall through.l5 On 
remand, the effect our ruling would have on the enforceability 
of the settlement agreement would be resolved by the DC in the 
first instance. However, the Court could still dispose of No. 
78-1545 by writing a ~ curiam stating that the CA correctly 
held (in its 1978 opinion) that the timely filing requirement is 
a jurisdictional matter and citing the decision in No. 80-951.16 
15The settlement agreement does not state what effect a 
partial reversal of the DC's approval of the settlement 
agreement would have on the parties' agreement. Plaintiffs 
state that "if this Court holds that the District Court lacks 
jurisdiction, TWA will undoubtedly disavow the Settlement 
Agreement as being unenforceable." Plaintiffs' Response, pp. 4-
5. 
16The issue raised in No. 78-1545 is the same issue that 
is inherent in question #1 in No. 80-951: Is the timely filing 
requirement a jurisdictional matter? However, in No. 78-1545 
plaintiffs raise that issue in the context of reviewing theCA's 
1978 holding that timely filing is a jurisdictional requirement, 
while in No. 80-951 IFFA raises that issue in the context of 
reviewing the CA' s 1980 holding that a settlement that avoided 
litigating this issue was proper. 
In No. 80-951, IFFA will argue that timely filing is 
jurisdictional and that the issue may not be settled. 
Plaintiffs and TWA will argue that the issue may be settled 
whether or not it is jurisdictional. Plaintiffs probably will 
also contend that the timely filing issue may be settled because 
it is not a jurisdictional matter, with TWA taking a contrary 
•• 
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As for No. 78-1549, I question whether any of the issues 
presented in that petition warrant review, and I would defer it 
by removing it from the argument calendar. If it does not later 
become moot, it could be DIG'd.l7 
position. 
17The first issue in No. 78-1549 is whether the DC 
properly granted summary judgment on the issue of liability. 
TWA's policy clearly precluded any mother from working as a 
flight attendant. Although TWA states that it did not have any 
male "flight attendants" during this period, it concedes that it 
had male cabin attendants called "pursers" on international 
flights. TWA did not terminate male cabin attendants who became 
fathers. 
The second issue is whether it would be unfair to require 
TWA to award back pay to these plaintiffs. TWA asserts that at 
the time the "no-motherhood" policy was in effect (from 1965 to 
1970) it was not at all clear that such a policy violated Title 
VII. Therefore, retrospective relief would be inequitable. 
The third issue is whether the CA erred in defining 
Subclass A (those who met the timely filing requirement). There 
are two parts to this argument. (1) The CA held that "permanent 
termination" occurred when the flight attendant became a mother. 
TWA contends that permanent termination occurred on the flight 
attendant's last day of work. This is simply a matter of 
construing TWA's policy. The CA described the policy as 
follows: "[Female flight attendants] who became mothers either 
by childbirth or by adoption were terminated permanently unless 
they were willing to accept employment in ground duty 
positions." (2) The CA held that plaintiffs who were 
permanently terminated as flight attendants in the 90-day period 
preceding the filing of EEOC charges were in Subclass A. It 
also held that the following type of plaintiff was in Subclass 
A: a flight attendant who became a mother and then returned to a 
ground duty position {pursuant to TWA's policy) although she 
wanted to return to a flight attendant position, and who was 
-20-
Conclusion: I would (1) deny TWA's and plaintiffs' motions; (2) 
limit the grant in No. 80-951 to Questions #1 and #2; (3) not 
defer or dismiss No. 78-1545; and (4) defer No. 78-1549 by 
removing it from the argument calendar. 
I suggest that we enter the 
"TWA's motion to limit rev1ew in No. 80-
951, Independent Federation of Flight Attendants 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., et al., to the 
order of the district court entitled "Order 
Awarding Seniority" and thereafter to dismiss 
No. 78-1545, Zipes, et al. v. Trans World 
Air 1 ines, Inc. , and No. 78-1549, Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Zipes, et al., as moot is 
denied. 
"The motion filed by petitioners in No. 78-
1545 (the "plaintiff class"), requesting that 
the Court (1) grant TWA's motion; or (2) order 
TWA and the plaintiff class to stipulate to 
dismissal of the writs in No. 78-1545 and 78-
1549; or (3) dismiss No. 78-1545 and No. 78-1549 
as moot, is denied. 
"No. 78-1549 is removed from the argument 
still working in that ground duty position during the 90-day 
period preceding the filing of EEOC charges. The CA 
distinguished United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 u.s. 553 (1977). 
In Evans the discriminatory policy was not in effect during the 
90 days preceding the filing of EEOC charges. 
If the Court determines that these three issues do not 
warrant review, the Court might be inclined to DIG No. 78-1549 
at this point. However, I am reluctant to finalize the CA' s 
1978 decision before the settlement is final. 
• • 
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calendar, and further consideration of that case 
is deferred. The writ of certiorari in No. 80-
951 is limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented in 
the petition for a writ of certiorari and is 
otherwise dismissed as improvidently granted." 
I . 
May 12, 1981 
80-951, Federation 
Dear Byron: 
Your proposed order (p. 20 of your memorandum) is 
fine with me. 
I appreciate your doing this careful study for the 
benefit of all of us. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
.· 
,.~. ~ 4.'-; .: 
I • 
CHAMBERS OF 
~u:prttttt Qfourl cf fltt~~ ~fattg 
~Mlyt:ngicn.tB. <!J. 21Jc?J!.2 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
May 12, 1981 
Re: 80-951, 78-1545 and 78-1549 - Independent 
Federation of Flight Attendants 
Dear Byron: 
Thanks for your thorough memorandum with 
the conclusions of which I agree. I would 
be glad to subscribe to the order you propose. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice \.\Thi te 
Copies to the Conference 
' . 















JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.§u:p-rmu <!fourl of firt 'Jlfuittb .§ta:U.a' 
'Jllfa,g fringLtn. ~. <!f. 20&! J!. ~ 
May 13, 1981 
RE: Nos. 78-1545, 1549 and 80-951 Zipes v. TWA; Ind. 
Fed. of Flight Attendants v. TWA 
Dear Byron: 
I too agree with your recommendation and proposed 
Order in the above. Your memorandum was certainly most 
persuasive as well as very complete. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.:§u.prrmt ~o-urt cf tqt ~tb ;§tafrg 
2.tagfringttnt. gl. QJ. 2!J~J.1~ 
May 13, 1981 
Re: No. 78-1545) Zipes v. TWA 
No. 78-1549) TWA v. Zipes 
No. 80-951 ) Ind. Fed. of Flight Attendants v. TWA 
Dear Byron: 
I concur with your recommendations and thank you for 
undertaking the task of studying the cases as thoroughly 




cc: The Conference 
:"f. 
--
..§u.pumt <!Jttnrl of tqt 'Jlln:ilib ..§hdts 
JlasftittgLtn. ~. "f. 2Ugt~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 








Copies to the Conference 
May 13, 1981 
- Zipes v. TWA, . Inc. 
- TWA, Inc. v. Zipes 




C HAMBE RS OF" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~UVrtlm {!j:ltlttt bf Ur~ ~nitdt ~mug 
~ltllfringtblt; ~. <!):. 20,?'1-~ 
No. 78-1545) - Zipes v. TWA 
No. 78-1549) - TWA v. Zipes 
May 13, 1981 
No. 80-951) - Ind. Fed. of Flight Attendants v. TWA 
Dear Byron: 
I a gree with e a ch a nd all of your recommendations as set 
forth in your very complete memora ndum of May 11. 
Sincerely, 
Mr . Justice White 
cc : The Conference 
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N POST DIS AFF 
MERITS MOTION 
ABSENT 
REV AFf G D 
No. 78-1545 
NOT VOTING 
To: Mr. Justice Powell November 24, 1981 
From: Mary i:J-_ i).c ~ ~ dll!/iii!JJ-~ ~ ~ 
~ )-(,._J._ ¥..oo ~- dc,."L !!> ~. C-4 7 ~ ~ 
No. 
No. 
78-1545, Ann Zipes, et al. v. TWA, Inc. (Case 1) 
~~~~-~Jt!-~ 
~  ~~~~~~-u~l-
80-951, Indep~hdent Federation of Flight Attendants ~ 
. -
2. 
Case 2. The initial question (in reviewing the CA7's 1980 
~
decision) is whether a DC can approve a settlement in which an award 
is made to a group whose claims have been held beyond the court's . 
jurisdiction by the CA. The answer to this question might, of 
course, depend on whether the claims were actually jurisdictionally 
barred. 
The next question is whether competitive-status seniority 
rights can be awarded--under the standard for awarding such rights 
articulated in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 
747 (1976) (once discrimination has been shown, full seniority 
should be awarded discriminatees in absence of unusual 
circumstances)--by a court pursuant to a settlement delegating that 
decision to the cqurt when only the employer and the pltf class have 
\ 
agreed to the settlement. 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1. Case 1. Resp TWA had a policy of terminating female 
(but not male) flight attendants when they became parents whether by 
birth or adoption. On May 30, 1970, a charge was filed with the 
EEOC challenging this practice. EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter, 
and a complaint was filed on Aug. 18, 1970, on behalf of a class 
which included all TWA hostesses who had been fired after becoming 
mothers at any time after July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title 
VII. One of the initial class representatives was the union then 
representing TWA's flight attendants, the Air Line Stewards and 
Stewardesses Ass'n (ALSSA). 1 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages • 
3. 
In 1971, TWA and the class representatives reached a 
settlement which provided for the rehiring of each class member with 
the amount of seniority held at the time of her termination. The . 
settlement was approved by the DC. Several class members appealed, 
and the CA7 reversed because of a conflict between ALSSA as class 
representative and ALSSA as union representing currently-working 
attendants. The settlement was vacated and the case remanded with 
instructions to replace ALSSA as class representative. 
In 1976, the DC awarded summary judgment in favor of the 
~ 
pltf class on liability. Judge McGarr found that the "no-
motherhood" policy was discriminatory and that the Title VII time 
limits did not bar the claims of any class members. An 
interlocutory appeal was taken. 2 
In the decision on review in Case 1, the CA7 again 
W\.- lt17% 
reversed the DC. The CA7 held that the claims of approximately 92% 
1\ '-. 
of time. These 
individuals had been terminated more than ninety days prior to May 
30, 1970, the filing date of the first EEOC charge, and §706(d) 
required that charges be filed within ninety days of the 
discriminatory practice. The CA7 held that the Title VII time 
requirements were 'urisdictional prerequisites and thus there was no 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims of the vast majority of 
1Flight attendants are now represented by Independent 
Federation of Flight Attenaants (Union), which is petr in case 2. 
2During the pendency of the appeal, on April 1, 1977, petr 
Union became the new collective bargaining representative for TWA 
flight attendants. 
the pltf class. 
The pltf class 
that the lower courts did have jurisdiction over the claims of al~ 
class members and that the deft had waived any statute-of-
limitations defense. Thereafter, the parties moved to defer -----
consideration of the cert petns in order to negotiate a new 
settlement. This request was granted, but the petns were eventually 
granted with the grant of cert in case 2--which reviews a subsequent 
CA7 decision approving a settlement the parties reached after this 
Court defered consideration of the cert petns on case 1. fJ.L: ~· 
2. Case 2. The pltfs and TWA reached a second u~
.. ~aa.t:t~r 
settlemen.t . It establishes tliO 11 sub-classes 11 : 
.--.. 
consisting of approximately 30 individuals whose claims are based on 
acts within ninety days of the filing of a charge, and~, 
consisting of 400 members whose claims are time-barred. TWA agreed 
to pay $1.5 million to each class and to offer a job to each member 
of each class. The DC was to decide whether the returning employees 
were to get retroactive competitive seniority. 
Upon learning of the new settlement and the likelihood 
that many women would be returning to the bargaining unit with large 
amounts of retroactive competitive senioity, the Union intervened ~ 
/10 p~~ 
and objected. The Union argued that the DC ha~o subject-matter
juisdiction to approve the settlement and grant~ retroactive 
competitive seniority since the CA7 already had determined that 
~ 
;;4-
there was no jurisdiction over sub-class B. The union also argued 
tha~he s~ttlement could not override the collective bargaining 





The DC overruled the Union's jurisdictional challenge on 
the ground that the CA7's decision was not final and not, therefore, 
binding. A hearing was held to determine the impact the settleme~t 
would have on the current bargaining unit members. A few weeks 
later, on Nov. 8, 1979, the DC entered two separate orders: (1) 
and (2) awardin full retroactive seniority to ~ subclasses. 
Although the DC's brief order awarding seniority does not cite any 
cases, it clearly uses the standard articulated in Franks v. Bowman. 
The DC stated: "the cour~ finding that full restoration of 
~ 
etroactive seniority will not have an unusual adverse impact upon 
c rrently employed flight attendants in a manner which is not 
typical of other Title VII cases." Petn for Cert in No. 80-951 at 
18a. 
The Union appealed the award of seniority by the DC, but 
the CA7 affirmed the DC. It held that, despite its earlier ruling 
regarding the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the DC 
nonetheless had jurisdiction to approve a class-action settlement 
and to grant seniority pursuant to that settlement over the Union's 
objections. It relied on (1) principles favoring settlements and 
~ 
[~:~(2) the notion that parties should not be forced to litigate the 
~-/ contested issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court noted 
~ that because the airlines hires 400-800 attendants in a normal year, 
less than a year. 
~ 
-~~ 
/1-?~~ ~.cu~.~~ 6. 
3. Hold in No. 78-1549. ___.. Cert was originally
No. 78-1549 as well as the two cases being argued, but it was~~ 
removed from the argument list and consideration deferred pending . 
I ( 
the outcome of the two argued cases. No. 78-1549 is a conditional 
'V\ 
cross-petn filed by TWA challenging the DC finding of liability 
prior to the entry of the settlement order and seniority-award order 
on Nov. 8, 1979. I~ the settlement order is affirmed--regardless of -
how this Court disposes of the seniority order--No. 78-1549 can be 
dismissed as moot since TWA's objections to liability are 
conditional: if the settlement order stands, TWA has no objections. 
~ )~ {? fl),J) 1981, (discussing proper disposition of No. 78-1549 and several~ 0/ 
As Justice White pointed out at 19 of his memo of May 11, 
~\!\motions), it is unlikely that any of the issues in No. 78-1549 ~ 
~rrant review even in the even the settlement order were overruled. 
~e suggested that it be DIG'd in the event it does not becom~ 
The issues involve (1) whether the no-motherhood policy really 
violated Title VII; (2) whether it was unfair to require TWA to 
pay back pay to pltfs for the period 1965-1970 when it was not clear 
that such a policy violated Title VII; and (3) whether the CA erred 
in defining subclass A (those who met the timely filing 
requirement) . This last objection is based on fact-bound arguments 
dealing with termination dates, etc. 
II. CASEl: IS FILING A CHARGE A JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE? 
A. Backgroud: Statute and Caselaw 
(1) The statute. At the time the pltfs' charge was filed 
in 1973, §706(d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. §2000e-
5 (d) (1970) 3 provided: 
1-l ~. , 
"A charge ••• shall be filed [with the EEOC] within ninety 
days after the a l i eged unlawful employment practice ==r 
OcCbrred .••• " 
Thus, the statute provides that suit can be brought on the basis of 
a charge filed with the EEOC during a certain time period. Although 
it is clear that in the typical case, suit cannot be brought unless 
a timely charge has been filed, it is not clear whether that -
requirement is absolute or whether it is subject to equitable 
...__--~ ::::. 
considerations that might weigh in favor of extending the time limit 
----~ 
(e.g., fraud). Typically, the question is framed as whether the 
time-limit is a statute of limitations (subject to equitable 
considerations) or jurisdictional (failure to meet time limit is an 
absolute bar to judicial consideration of a claim) . 
Implicit in this issue is the question of who has the 
burden of pleading and proving either compliance or non-compliance 
with the requirement. Although a pltf must plead and prove 
compliance with a jurisdictional prerequisite, failure to meet a 5~~ 
t..-1.-
statute of limitations is a matter that must be raised as an ~
affirmative defense under rule 8(c) of the Fed. R. of Civ. P. ~ 
is an intermediate possibility: the provision can be regarded as a 
condition precedent to suit; as such, it would be regarded subject 
to tolling in light of equitable considerations, but would remain a 
matter for the pltf to plead and prove. 
3In 1972, §706(d) was amended to allow filing of a charge 
within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. It is now 
codified at 42 u.s.c. §2000e-5(e). The filing provision will be 
referred to herein as "706(d} ." 
.. 
vo 
(3) Prior decisions of this Court. 
(a) Use of the term "jurisdictional prerequisite" in past 
S. Ct. decisions. The Court has discussed the filing requirement on 
several occasions and has used a variety of terms in referring to 
---------.. 
it. In Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972) (Stewart, J.), the 
Court held that the filing requirement should not be interpreted in 
an overly rigid manner (so as to require multiple filings in some 
situations) and referred to it as a "statutory prerequisite." Id. 
at 523. 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 u.s. 792 (1973) 
(Powell, J.), the Court noted in presenting the background of the 
J ,, 
case that "[r]espondent satisfied the ~ urisdictional prerequisites 
to a federal action (i) by filing timely charges of employment 
discrimination with the Commission and (ii) by receiving and acting 
upon the Commissions's statutory notice of the right to sue." Id. 
at 798 • 
. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) 
(Powell, J.), the Court held that an employee's resort to labor 
arbitrartion did not bar a Title-VII action. In doing so, the Court 
noted that the petr had met the "jurisdctional prerequisites" 
defined "with precision" in Title VII: (1) a timely-filed charge, 
and (2) a right-to-sue notice. Id. at 47. 
In Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 
229 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.), the petrs argued that the statutory 
period for filing a claim with the EEOC should toll during the 
pendency of grievance of arbitration procedures under the 
collective-bargaining contract. The Court ruled that the statutory 
l 
9. 
period was not tolled, and noting that this was not a case in which 
a party had been prevented from asserting its rights. Id. at 237 
n.lO. In response to petrs' argument that tolling would impose 
almost no costs and only slight delays, the Court explained that 
"the principal answer to this contention is that Congress has 
already spoken with respect to what it considers acceptable delay 
when it established a 90-day limitations period, and gave no 
indication that it considered a 'slight' delay followed by 90 days 
equally acceptable." Id. at 240. The Court noted that adherence to 
the limitations period "assures the employer of [notification] of an 
alleged violation." Id. n. 14. 
Finally, in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 u.s. 553 
{1977) {Stevens, J.), the Court held that the employer had not 
continued to violate Title VII by refusing to credit resp {after re-
hiring her in 1972) with pre-1972 seniority. The Court noted that a 
claim based on her original termination in 1968 was now time-barred, 
and that "[t]imely filing is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a 
Title VII action." Id. at 555 n.4 {citing Robbins & Myers and 
Alexander, discussed above). 
{b) Limitations period. In Delaware State College v. 
Ricks, -- U.S. , 101 S. Ct. 498, 506 {1980) {Powell,. J.), the 
Court referred to the timely-filing requirement as a "limitations 
period." And in Robbins v. Myer, discussed above, the there were 
several refernces to "tolling the limitations period." E.g., 429 
u.s. 229. Evans also used the statute-of-limitations label as well 
as the "jurisdictional prerequisite" label. For other examples of 
cases using limitations labels, see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. 
t"',: 1 
10. 
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 371-72 (1977); United Air Lines, Inc. v. 
~ 
McDonald, 432 u.s. 385, 391-92 (1977); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 
u.s. 807, 818-813 (1980). 
I 
(c) Supreme Court consideration of similar provision in 
~ The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) has a filing 
~rement similar to that in Title VII. See 29 u.s.c. §626(d). 
It is likely the Court will construe the two provisions in the same 
manner. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979) 
("We •.. hold that under §14(b) of the ADEA, as under §706(c) of 
Title VII, resort to administrative remedies in deferral States by 
individual claimants is mandatory, not optional."). 
In Dratt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F. 2d 1256, 1258-60 (CAlO 
1976), the CAlO viewed these filing requirements as analogous to 
Title VII and drew upon Title VII precedents in determining whether 
equitable modification was available to the plantiff. It concluded 
that the filing requirement was subject to tolling and estoppel. As 
the parties note, this Court affirmed by an equally divided Court 
(4-4). Shell Oil Co. v. Dratt, 434 u.s. 99 (1977) (per curiam). I 
checked the Conference notes, and the Court would have held that the 
filing requirements were not jurisdictional, though only four were 
willing to find actual tolling in that case. There was no equitable 
tolling ground (such as fraud or infancy) ; the CAlO allowed tolling 
simply because the deft received notice that the pltf had a 
grievance within the statutory period. 
Only CJ thought the limitations period juridsdictional. Jt P~~ 
WJB, BRW, TM, and HAB thought that the limitations period was not 
jurisdictional, and that notice to the deft was enough to toll it • 
.. 
c-;t/7 ~ 11. 
You, WHR, and JPS considered the period no~fc?ti~ ~t£~ 
would only have applied equitable tolling c
which were supported by the facts in the cas~~~ 
{3) Decisions in the CAs. In Coke v. General Adjustment 
Bureau, 640 F. 2d S84 {CAS 1981) {en bane) {Anderson, J) the CAS 
overruled an earlier CAS decision that had regarded the filing 
requirement of the ADEA as jurisdictional, and the CAS considered 
the new rule applicable in Title-VII cases as well as ADEA cases. 
In this decision, the CAS held that Title VII and ADEA were subject 
to equitable tolling and that, in the case before it, summary 
judgment was inappropriate because there was a material fact in 
dispute relevant to equitable tolling based on misrepresentation and 
reasonable reliance. 4 
Before overruling its prior decision, the CAS undertook a 
thorough analysis of the entire area, including the current 
I L '" positions of the other CAs. The CA7 currently stands alone in 
holding that timely compliance with the charge-filing provisison is 
"jurisdictional" in the sense that compliance with it determines the 
jurisdiction of the DC regardless of circumstances in the case 
supporting tolling on equitable grounds. 
4The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom the summary-judgment motion had been made, were: 
{1) the employer misrepresented to a client that the demoted 
employee would be reinstated in his old position; {2) the 
employer knew or should resonably have known that the client 
would convey the misrepresentation to the employee; and {3) the 
employee reasonably relied on the misrepresentation in 
forebearing to file a claim. 640 F. 2d at S9S-96. 
~ r~ J'-'(J , .LI.o 
Six CAs (CA3, CAS, CA6, CA9, )~~ that 
the charge-filing period is subject to equitable modification. See 
Hart v. J.T. Baker Chemical Corp, S89 F. 2d 829, 832-833 (CA3 1979): 
Oaxaca v. Roscoe, 641 F. 2d 386 (CAS 1981): Leake v. City of 
Cincinnati, 60S F. 2d 2SS, 2S9 (CA6 1979): Cooper v. Bell, 628 F. 
2d 1208, 1212-1214 (CA9 1980): Sanchez v. TWA, 499 F. 2d 1107, 1108 
(CAlO 1974): Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., S67 F. 2d 429, 474 
( CADC 19 7 6 ) , c e r t • denied , 4 3 4 U • S • 1 0 8 6 ( 19 7 8 ) • 
The CA4 has not considered the issue with respect to the 
charge-filing period, but it has held that the suit-filing 
limitations period, Title VII §706(f) (1), 42 u.s.c. 20000e-S(f) (1), 
is subject to equitable modification. Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual 
Ins. Co., 469 F. 2d 268, 269 (1972), cert. denied, 410 u.s. 939 
(1973). The CAl and the CA2 have left the question open. Daughtry 
v. King's Dept. Stores, Inc., 608 F. d 906, 909 (CAl 1979): Smith 
v. American President Lines, Ltd., S71 F. 2d 102, 109 (CA2 1978). 
In Satz v. ITT Financial Corp., 619 F. 2d 738, 74S n.ll (1980), the 
CAB noted that, "Congress appears to have regarded the time period 
as a statute of limitations." 
(4) Legislative history. The legislative history 
provides no definitive answer, but, on balance, suggests that the 
time limit should not be regarded as a jurisdictional bar but rather 
as something more akin to a statute of limitations. See discussion 
in SG's brief at lS-18. For example, when the filing period was 
extended from 90 to 180 days in 1972, both the House and Senate 
Committee reports referred to the enlarged period as either a 
. ., 
"limitation period" or a "statute of limitations" that is "similar" 
or "identical" to the limitations period of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) 5--and the CAs have uniformly held that the NLRA 
provision is a statute of limitations subject to recognized 
equitable doctrines, rather than a restriction on the NLRB's 
jurisdiction. 6 
B. Discussion 
Congress legislates against a background of judically 
created equitable exceptions to seemingly preclusive time 
limitations. See, e.g., American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 
U.S. 538, 558-59 (1974): Burnett v. N.Y. Central R.R., 380 u.s. 424 
(1965). Given this backgroud, it is unlikely Congress meant to 
deprive courts of the power to consider untimely claims in cases in 
which, for example, employer fraud caused the filing delay. Another 
reason that the Court might not consider the filing of a claim a 
true "jurisdictional prerequisite" is the fact that the Court does 
not require that each member of a class file one. See United Air 
Lines v. McDonald, 432 u.s. 385, 389 n.6 (1977). This is unlike the 
approach taken with regard to jurisdictional amounts in class 
actions brought on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. There, each 
class member must meet the jurisdictional minimum in order to 
5 SeeS. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1971): H.R. 
Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1971). 
6see, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F. 2d 
429, 475 n.351 (CADC 1976) • 
. ' . ·,.,I' 
participate. 
(1973). 
Although a reasonable opinion could be written either way, 
it seems unnecessarily har h to hold that no equitable exception can~ 
ever be recognized, not even employer fraud. I would therefore 
suggest that the statute be interpreted as allowing tolling in the 
traditional equitable situations: (1) legal disability such as 
infancy or temporary insanity; (2) specific legal prohibitions on 
the filing of a suit; and (3) fraudulent or other misleading 
conduct on the part of the deft. None of these factors was, of 
course, present in~t~is_cas~. 
- -- Here, the only issue is whether deft (TWA) waived the statute of limitations. That question 
addressed in the next subsection, but there is still a final 
question that must be considered with regard to the proper treatment 
of the timely-filing requirement. 
As mentioned earlier, an implicit issue in the question 
whether the filing requirement is a "jurisdictional prerequisite" or 
a "statute of limitations" is whether it is a matter for the pltf to 
plead and prove of something the deft must raise as an affirmative 
defense. And, as I mentioned above, there is an intermediate 
position: the requirement can be regarded as a "condition j 
precedent," subject to equitable considerations, but the pltf's ___. 
responsibility to plead and prove. 7 
~~~ 
7FELA time limits have been treated as condition ~~ 
precedents. In Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 
235 (1959), which disagreed with several earlier FELA cases, the 
Court permitted non-compliance with the FELA time limit to be 
excused by estoppel because the deft had induced the pltf's 
Footnote continued on next page. 
•·· 
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current practice seems to be for he plft to plead a The 
timely filing in the complaint. See I Joint Appendix (JA) at 7a, 
~11 (pltfs plead it in complaint in case at bar). As a matter of . ------ _________. 
reasonable allocation of responsibilities, this seems right. It 
after all, the pltf that is responsible for filing the complaint 
who should know when (and whether) it was done. Moreover, I think 
the Court's earlier use of the term "jurisdictional prerequisite" 
reflected an appreciation of this point. This approach was adopted 
in EEOC v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F. 2d 187, 190 (CA9 1974) •8 
I looked at the other CA opinions cited in subsection A.3, supra, as 
holding that the filing-period is subject to equitable modification, 
but none of them focus on who should plead and prove what. 
In conclusion, I would suggest that the filing-period 
not a jurisdictional prerequisite, i.e., it is not a limit on 
power of the courts to hear claims. Instead, it is akin to a 
statute of limitations in that it is subject to equitable 
modification. But, under the statute, the burden of filing 
complaint is on the employee, and the filing should, therefore, 
treated as a condition precedent to suit--something to be 
proved by the pltf. Such a holding would merely continue what 
appears to be the current practice of the parties. 
delay. But the pltf was required to plead and prove how he was 
misled by the deft." 
8There, the court said that the preliminary requirements of 
§706(f) (1) and (3) were procedural steps that "are most 
reasonably considered conditions precedent." The court held that 
performance of the conditions could be plead generally as 
permitted by rule 9(c). 
16. 
C. Did Deft TWA Waive Time Limit? 
If the statute is not jurisdictional, not only can it be 
tolled, the deft can waive non-compliance if he so chooses. The 
pltf class argues that the deft has waived compliance in the case at ----- ~---------
bar. See Brief of Pltf Class (red) at 34-35. And TWA argues that, 
on the facts here, there was no waiver. See Brief of TWA (red) at /U()r 
I think it is clear that there was no waiver here other~ 
43-48. 
- # ~b()Jt 
TWA did not raise the "sta_;:=-~ than for purposes of the settlement. 
of limitations" as an affirmative defense in its answer becaus~ 
~ controlling CA7 precedent held that a timely filing was a 
"jurisdictional precondition to the commencement of a cour
Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F. 2d 357, 359 (CA7 1968). 
Indeed, the pltf-class had plead a timely filing, and TWA denied 
that contention. Moreover, the settlement amount was 
understanding of all parties that a substantial number of 
(92%) were probably time-barred. The concession to waive 
filing during settlement negotiations does not operate 
in the event the settlement does not materialize. 
If this Court upholds the settlement, waiver is not an 
issue--even TWA agrees it was waived timely filing for purposes of 
the settlement. If this Court overrules the settlement for any 
reason, however, it will then be important whether TWA waived the 
timely-filing requirement. If it has, then the case should be 
remanded with directions to proceed on the merits with regard to 
subclass B as well as subclass A without regard to the delay in 
filing. On the other hand, if TWA has not waived the timely-filing 
... 
'· 
requirement {and the settlement is overturned) , the claims of 
subclass B should be dismissed on remand. 
.L I • 
III. CASE 2: CAN DC APPROVE SETTLEMENT TO PLTFS WHOSE CLAIMS ARE 
TIME-BARRED? 
If the filing requirement is not jurisdictional, it 
follows that the DC had power to approve the settlement at issue in 
case 2. {Whether this was done under the proper standard is 
discussed in the next section.) 
If you regard the filing requirement as jurisdictional, 
however, then I think it likely the DC had no power to enter the 
court order approving the settlement. Jurisdiction cannot be 
provided by stipulation, consent, waiver, or conduct by the parties. 
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 u.s. 237 {1934); American Fire 
and Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 u.s. 6 {1951). A challenge to a 
court's jurisdiction may be raised by anyone at any time, even by 
parties who stipulated to or argued for the existence of 
jurisdiction at one point and raised the issue for the first time on 
appeal. See Mitchell v. Maurer, supra. A court, whether trial or 
appellate, is obligated to inquire sua sponte into the jurisdiction 
of the DC and to dismiss any claim once it is determined that the 
court lacks jurisdiction over it. Id. 
Prior to the decision below, there was no doubt that the 
principle of limited subject matter jurisdiction applied to court 
actions in connection with approval of settlements, class-action or 
otherwise. See United States v. Boe, 543 F. 2d 151, 158-59 {CCPA 
1976); Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F. 2d 108, 112 (CA7 1976). In 
Patterson, the CA7 said "[d]espite the withdrawal [of a motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction] the District Court would have no 
authority to approve the settlement had it lacked jurisdiction." 
528 F. 2d at 112 n.5. 
Indeed, in Case 1 of the two decisions before the Court on 
cert, the CA7 said, in discussing whether TWA's statements made in 
negotiating the original settlement (overruled by the CA7 because of 
the Union's conflict of interest) were a waiver of the timely-filing 
requirement, the CA7 said: "we need not reach this question as our 
conclusion that this filing requirement was jurisdictional precludes 
a finding of waiver." Petn for cert in No. 78-1545 at Al6. 
The CA7 held that the DC had jurisdiction to approve a 
settlement even if it lacked jurisdiction over the case because 
parties should not be forced to litigate jurisdictional questions. 
As the union points out in its brief in No. 80-951 (blue) at 43, the 
problem with this argument is that the parties could have reached a 
settlement and stopped litigating jurisdictional questions without a 
court order--or with a court-approved settlement that did not affect 
the rights of anyone other than parties to the settlement. Instead, 
the pltf-class and TWA used the court to grant competitive-status 
seniority and supersede the collective bargaining agreement with 
regard to rights of those not parties to the settlement agreement 
and without any determination, through litigation, that the members 
of subclass B had viable and legitimate claims of discrimination. 
If the Court considers the filing-requirement a 
. 'I 
jurisdictional 
. 7lcJt-~~ ~~-~ 
"-" b'"J.t...-~. "-.../~ r ~ ~9 • 
~ ,ts ~-~ .to- ...l9c 
prerequis~e, then the DC lacked jurisdiction to 
enter the settlement with regard to the claims of subclass B, and 
those claims should be dismissed on remand. The only question then 
remaining is whether the DC properly applied the standard of Franks 
v. Bowman in deciding to award seniority rights to subclass A. If, 
however, the Court finds that the filing requirement is not 
jurisdictional, then the settlement order should be affirmed because 
the DC had the requisite jurisdiction to enter it. The remaining 
question then becomes whether, in the seniority-award order, the DC 
applied the appropriate standard in determining that all members of 
both subclasses should receive full retroactive seniority rights. 
These questions are discussed in the next section. 
IV. CASE 2: DOES STANDARD OF FRANKS v. BOWMAN APPLY TO AWARD OF - --
CONPETITIVE-STATUS SENIORITY BY COURT PURSUANT TO SETTLEMENT 
NEGOTIATED BY THE PARTIES BUT NOT INCLUDING AWARD OF SUCH SENIORITY? 
In the case at bar, the employer and the pltf-class did 
not actually reach an agreement on competitive-status seniority 
rights. Instead, they reached a settlement in which one term 
provided that the DC would award the appropriate competitive-status 
-------~----~-------------------------------------------seniority. We are not dealing, therefore, with a situation in which 
~ 
the employer and the pltf-class have actually agreed upon a 
settlement that includes the award of specified amounts of 
competitive-status seniority. If such a settlement were reached, it 
could not be enforced absent court approval, because neither the 





ri hts9 of absent employees. If such a settlement--awarding 
20. 
specific competitive-status seniority--were presented to a court for 
its approval the court should approve the award of competitive-
status seniority only under the standard that should apply in the 
case at bar. In other words, whatever standard is appropriate for 
court-ordered seniority in cases such as this one should also be 
used when the employer and the pltf-class seek court approval of a 
settlement they have worked out granting competitive-status 
seniority. 
The pltf class, the EEOC, and TWA all argue that the ~ v v ~ 
~ 
Franks-v.-Bowman standard was the proper one to apply in this c;:~~ 
They argue that there was a finding of liabiltiy by the DC, i.e.,~ 
that TWA's no-parenthood-for women policy violated Title VII. If J 
some claims were barred, it was only by the technical filing 
requirement. Under such circumstances, a court can modify seniority 
rights and can award class members full-competitive seniority in 
order to place the pltfs in the position they would have been in but 
for the discrimination as long as there was no unusual (in 
comparison with other Title VII cases} circumstances cautioning 
9It is true that under Franks v. Bowman and International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 u.s. 324 (1977}, 
employees' seniority rights are not vested property rights 
entitled to the protection of the due process clause. But this 
does not mean such rights are entitled to no protection in any 
circumstances. Indeed, courts routinely protect such rights in 
many circumstances. And, as discussed in text in IV.B.2(a} 
infra, §703(h} of Title VII affords some special protection to 




against such awards (the standard of Franks v. Bowman). 
A. Standard for Settlement of Claims of Subclass A 
1. If filing requirement not jurisdictional. If the DC 
did have jurisdiction of approve the settlement, then there has been 
a determination of liability to which no one objects (the only 
objection to liability is in TWA's cross-petn in No. 78-1549 which 
raises the objection only in the event the settlement order is 
overruled). In this situation, the settlement is really only a 
settlement as to damages. Viewed in this light, the Court properly 
used the Franks v. Bowman standard. 
To put the same point another way, the Union can challenge~ 
the lower court's award of retroactive seniority~ subclass A~ 
on two grounds: (1) that there was really no violation of Title VII 
by the no-parenthood policy (and therefore no basis for liability) 
or (2) that the awards of competitive seniority in this case were 
unreasonable given the disruption they may cause with regard to the 
current employees, as discussed in the following section IV.B (i.e., 
although there was liability, the remedy afforded in the settlement 
is unreasonable). Cert was, however, not granted on #2 (cert was 
not granted on question 3 of petn in No. 80-951). And the Union 
does not argue that the no-parenthood policy was legal--indeed, the 
predecessor Union filed the original charge of discrimination 
against that policy. 
When there is a finding of liability to which the Union 
does not object, an award of seniority under the Franks standard is 
proper. In this situation, the only uncontested issued is the 
22. 
appropriate remedy--and Franks groverns that award. 
2. If filing requirement is jurisdictional. If the DC did 
not have jurisdiction to approve the settlement over subclass B, 
then the settlement-approval order will be overruled. If the 
settlement-approval order is overruled, then this question (should 
Franks v. Bowman standard apply to award of seniority in 
settlement?) becomes moot--except that, on remand, another 
settlement might be worked out and the appropriate standard for 
determining whether to award full competitive-status seniority 
rights will again be relevant. As discussed below, such rights 
should be awarded under the usual (Franks) standard in a settlement 
only when liability has been determined and is uncontested. 
(I don't think the Union really objects to the award of 
seniority benefits to subclass A, though it might be a good idea to 
clarify this point at oral argument. Only 33 persons from subclass 
A are expected to return to work.) 
B. Standard for Settlement of Claims of Subclass B 
1. If filing requirement is jurisdictional. If the 
filing requirement is jurisdiction, this issue disappears because 
these claims are jurisdictionally barred and should be dismissed on 
remand. 
2. If filing requirement is not jurisdictional. Here, all 
violations of Title VII are time-barred. Through the DC's award of 
competitive-staus seniority, a bona fide seniority system has been 
modified because there was once a violation of Title VII. And that 
modification was adopted without the consent of affected workers and 
23. 
under the standard of virtually automatic standard of Franks: 
authorizing such grants to remedy past discrimination in the absence 
of circumstances not present in the typical Title-VII case. ~ 
This Court's prior cases suggest that the standard of ~ 
Franks v. Bowman should not apply in settlement situations. In ~ 
Franks v. Bowman itself, the Court indicated that on the remand,~ 
competitive-status seniority would only be awarded to those ~~ 
actual victims of discrimination. See 424 u.s. at 762 ("whether an 
award of seniority relief is appropriate under the remedial 
provisions of Title VII, specifically, §706(g)."}. 
And in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 u.s. 553 
(1977), the Court held that a time-barred discriminatory act cannot 
be the basis for modification of a valid seniority system. Such 
systems are protected by §703(h) of Title VII, which provides that: 
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, it 
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer. to apply different standards of compensation, or 
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, ..•• " 
In Evans, the Court held that the fact that a person was in a lower 
position, seniority-wise, than would have been true had there been 
no past discrimination did not itself constitute a violation of 
Title VII. In so doing, the Court noted that "a challenge to a 
neutral system may not be predicated on the mere fact that a past 
event which has no present legal significance has affected the 
calculation of seniority credit, even if the past event might at one 
time have justified a valid claim against the employer." 431 U.S. 
at 560. 
In the settlement, the DC modified seniority under a bona 
fide seniority system on the basis of time-barred claims. This 
result is clearly contrary to Evans except insofar as the court 
order of competitive-status seniority changes analysis. There are 
two questions implicit in this issue: {a} under what standard 
should a DC award {or approve} the grant of retroactive seniority 
rights pursuant to a settlement to which the union and current 
employees have not agreed? and {b) what issues should the union {or 
current employees} be able to raise in objecting to such a 
settlement? 
{a} What should be the standard when there has been no 
uncontested finding as to liability? As discussed above at 21-22, 
when there has been a determination of liability by the DC to which 
the Union does not object, any settlement between the employer and 
the pltf{s} is only a settlement as to damages and the Franks v. 
Borman rule should apply. But when there has been no uncontested 
finding of liability, and the DC awards {or approves} the grant of 
retroactive seniority pursuant to the terms of a settlement, it is 
allowing an adjustment in a bona fide seniority system without any 
final finding of a viable claim of discrimination. The rights of 
the pltf{s} to the relief is not clear as it was in Franks. On the 
other hand, it would be unfortunate to adopt a rule precluding the 
grant of any retroactive competitive seniority pursuant to a 
settlement without Union approval of the settlement. Such a rule 
would make settlements difficult and would give Unions the power to 
block even reasonable grants of retroactive seniority to any group 
or individual. 
25. 
Given the competing policy considerations in the settlement 
situation--the need to protect the rights of current employees in 
the absence of any final finding of a viable claim of discrimination 
and the desire to create an environment in which settlements are 
possible--! think the best solution would be to hold that the DC has 
discretion to award appropriate seniority in light of all the 
relevant equitable factors. For example, in the case at bar, the DC 
should not have applied the automatic Franks v. Bowman standard, but 
should have given careful consideration to the fact that any award 
to subclass B is at the expense of other workers who were working 
the unpopular flights during the years subclass B slept on its 
rights. I would suggest that a rule not unlike that you proposed by 
the Franks dissent is appropriate when the DC is awarding (or 
approving) competitive-status seniority under a settlement. 
In ~ Franks dissent (joined by Justice Rehquist) (CJ 
wrote separately but said he was in general agreement with you), you 
argued that the language of Title VII did not support the automatic 
grant of competitive-status seniority and that the DC should have 
the discretionary power to determine when such relief is appropriate 
given the competing equities of each case. I ag~h the Franks 
dissent and, at a minimum, the rule it proposes ~h be adopted as 
~ 
the standard when retroactive competitive-status seniority is 
awarded in settlement agreements. 
In summary, it would be inconsistent with Evans and 
extremely unfair to expand the majority rule in Franks to grant 
automatic retroactive competitive-status seniority to pltfs in 
settlements when there has been no final finding of liability. Any 
26. 
automatic grant in such circumstances would enable employers to 
settle their liability by a grant of relief costing the employer 
nothing at the expense of current employees. 
If the standard of Franks should not apply in settlement 
situations, then the DC's award of retroactive competitive-status 
seniority should be vacated and the case remanded for it to consider 
the award to subclass B in light of the proper standard. If this ---------happens, it is possible that subclass B will not receive full 
retroactive seniority. 10 
Re-employment will occur as vacancies (not filled by a non-
class member with greater seniority} arise, and there are many other 
ways in which seniority is relevant to priorities in job selection. 
See Union's Brief (blue} 6-11. Changes in relative seniority may 
have major implications in terms of a person's ability to continue 
to meet responsiblities that may have been assummed in reliance on a 
person's current status. For example, an attendant might have 
accumulated enough seniority to bid and get a "cream-puff" run--
i.e., a daily flight during weekdays allowing her to work while her 
children are in school. Such a person may be vulnerable to 
10Although cert was not granted on whether the detrimental 
impact on current employees is so great as to preclude the grant 
of competitive-status seniority in this case (question 3 in petn 
No. 80-951}, the question framed in text does not address that 
question but rather whether the Farnks standard should apply at 
all in determining whether to award such seniority in cases such 
as this involving settlements. That question is in question 2 of 
petn No. 80-951. Question 2 states the question as whether the 
DC should have applied the standard of Franks without regard to 
the fact that there has been no finding on liability--in other 
words, in a settlement situation. 
27. 
"bumping" by class members with retroactive seniority after relying 
on--and making who knows what arrangements--what seemed to be her 
fixed and definite seniority under contracts between TWA and Union. 
Seniorty changes may also force current employees to 
relocate to new cities as their home bases (or commute). TWA's 
flight attendants work out of domiciles or base stations located in 
N.Y., Boston, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, San Francisco, and 
Los Angeles. 
Because the DC used the standard of Franks v. Bowman, 
there is only limited data on the extent to which the grant of 
retroactive competitive seniority will affect TWA's current 
employees. Subclass A has 33 or so members, but 172 members of -- - -
subclass B are expected to return to work. It is true that TWA has 
over 6000 attendants and normally hires 400-800 per year, but in the 
18 months prior to the settlement, 400 had been laid off. At the 
present time, 30511 are on lay off. 12 In II J.A. at 132-138 there 
are some charts with information relevant to the effect returning 
pltfs will have, but these charts do not show whether the seniority 
changes will result in changes in the home cities of any current 
employees or cause major changes in the schedules of current 
employees. Instead, they only reveal information such as the fact 
11The excess workforce is higher than this figure because 
contractual provisions require that TWA offer leaves of absence 
in order to reduce the number of lay-offs. 
12TWA has been through rough times lately. The 305 were 
laid off in two groups: 164 on June Oct. 30, 1979 and 141 on 
June 30, 1980. 
·, . 
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that San Francisco is currently the home base for 665 employees and 
that 30 returning classmembers from subclass B are expected to want 
to reside there. Id. at 138. 
To summarize, as the discussion of subclass A's settlement 
~
(see 21-22) indicates, if there is a finding of liability by even 
the DC (without appellate review) prior to settlement, I see no 
reason not to allow the use of the Franks standard unless the union 
contests the employer's liability. When there is no finding of 
liability or when the Union contests liability, then the standard of 
the Franks dissent should be used in deciding whether to award 
seniority. 
(b) When retroactive competitive-status seniority is 
awarded by DC pursuant to settlement, what issues should Union be 
able to challenge? The remaining question is what issues should the 
Union should be able to raise in challenging the grant of seniority 
under such a settlement? There are good reasons why the Union 
should be able to challenge only the award of competitive-status 
seniority itself (under the standard of the Franks dissent) rather 
than every issue settled by the settlement. That issue is, of 
course, the only one with which the Union is really concerned. If 
the award is unfair (under the standard of the Franks dissent) the 
Union can and should challenge the unfairness directly--for example, 
in the case at bar it can argue against the grant of automatic 
competitive-status seniortiy to those who have slept on their rights 
for up to five years at the expense of innocent employees who worked 
the graveyard flights during that period. 
If the Union were allowed to litigate everything, e.g., 
.. 
29. 
underlying liability, settlements would be almost impossible. Even 
when only one pltf sued, the union would be able to block any 
settlement awarding competitive-status seniority by fighting all the 
other issues. As a result, it would be difficult to reach effective 
settlements. In considering competing equities under the standard 
of the Franks dissent, the DC can of course consider the likelihood 
that the pltf(s) have live, legitimate claims of discrimination--but 
there is no reason to allow the union to block the settlement by 
fighting liaility all the way to the s.ct. provided the DC does take 
such factors into account in balancing the competing equities. 
Since the union's legitimate interest can be protected by allowing 
it to challenge the remedial grant of competitive-status seniority 
under the discretionary standard of the Franks dissent, there is no 
need to allow it to disrupt settlments by litigating other issues, 
such as the employer's liability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A. Timely Filing Is Jurisdictional 
If the failure to file a charge is a jurisdictional 
defect, then the DC lacked jurisdiction to enter the settlement and 
both the settlement order and the seniority-award order should be 
vacated. On remand, the claims of subclass B should be dismissed as 
time-barred because there can be no waiver of a jurisdictional 
requirement. The pending cert in No. 78-1549 should be DIG'd (no 
certworthy issue). Since there has been a finding of liability with 
regard to subclass A (uncontested by anyone other than TWA and TWA 
is bound by the earlier finding) the DC will be free to enter a new 
settlement as to damages between subclass A and TWA. Because 
liability will have been determined, 13 retroactive competitive 
30. 
seniority can be awarded to that subclass in such a settlement unqer 
the standard of Franks v. Borden. 
B. Timely Filing Is Not Jurisdictional 
If the filing requirement is not jurisdictional, then the 
l\ ,, 
settlement order should be sustained. Cross-petn in No. 78-1549 
should be dismissed as moot since it contains TWA's objections to 
liability in the event the settlement is not upheld. 
The question then becomes whether the DC erred in applying 
the standard of Franks v. Borman to the award of seniority rights 
under the settlement. 
With regard to subclass A, the application of the Franks 
v. Borman standard was proper because there was a finding of .... 
uncontested liability as to sublass A (only TWA would contest 
liability and then only if the settlement were not upheld). 
The DC did err in applying the Franks v. Borman standard 
to the question of seniority rights of subclass B. With regard to 
these claims, there had been no finding of liability, let alone a 
finding uncontested by the union. Indeed, when the DC ordered the 
grant of competitive-status seniorty, all claims of subclass B had 
----------~--------------------
b en found time-barred. In this situation, the DC should have 
awarded competitive seniority under the standard of the Franks 
13The DIG of No. 78-1549 makes the earlier finding of 
liability final and conclusive as to TWA • 
.. 
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dissent rather than the standard of the Franks majority. The order 
awarding seniority should be vacated and the case remanded for the 
DC's consideration of whether retroactive competive-status seniority 
is appropriate when all the relevant equities are considered • 
. ' . 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Mary 
In Re: Nos. 78-1545 & 80-951, IFFA v. TWA & Zipes, et. al. 
In its reply brief (your copy is attached), the Union 
makes a strong argument that without either (1) a final judicial 
finding of liability or (2) the union's agreement to a settlement, a 
court simply lacks the power to affect seniority rights awarded 
under a collective-bargaining agreement. See IFFA brief (yellow) at 
13-18. This argument is not without merit. Relief is given in 
Title VII suits under §706(g), but §706(g) authorizes courts to 
award relief to remedy violations that are not time-barred. In 
settlements, there is no final finding of a violation. Even if the 
DC had made such a finding at the time of the settlement (which it 
could not have because the CA7 had held subclass B's claims time-
barred), that finding would not have been a final finding, at the 
end of litigation; settlements are always premature ends to 
litigation. 
The only argument against this point is a policy one--this 
approach might give unions too much power to block awards of 
competitive-status seniority in settlements even when reasonable. I 
don't have any idea whether the rule the union proposes would make 
it too difficult to reach settlements. 
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.JUSTICE W .... .J . BRENNAN, .JR . 
RE: No. 78-1545 and 80-951 Zipes v. T;~ w::_:~ 
ttu_ ~ f-/ ~ I 1-rv tlU.-{ 
Some of us were concerned whether the Franks v. ~ ~ 
Bowman remedy of retroactive seniority was proper here. ~ ~ 
You may be interested in the attached memorandum of my 
clerk Mary Mikva on that question. ~ ~ Jl::i) 
r-~?. 
W.J.B.Jr. 
RE: 78-1545 and 80-951 Zipes v. TWA 
TO: Justice Brennan 
FROM: Mary Mikva 
DATE: December 8, 1981 
I have some 
w ~ ~ IT( ~ ()fo-0 
~9~~ 
on Zipes (78 1545 and 80-951). ~ 
First
1 
to clarify some 
plaintiffs' union when 
ackground. The ALSSA, which was th~~ 




A settlement was first reached in 
...,). 
lement hearings~ waived any statute of 
That settlement had no retroactive -
seniority or backpay, and the CA 7 threw it out on the basis that · 
the union had conflicting interests since it represented 
incumbent employees and plaintiffs. The present plaintiffs were 
appointed to represent the class and the case was consolidated 
with the American Airlines case. In 1974 TWA moved to and was 
granted leave to amend its answer to assert a statute of 
limitations defense, but the DC noted that the delay in asserting 
that defense might ulimately constitute a waiver of that defense. 
In Oct. of~~he DC denied the airlines' motion to exclude ~G 
class memb~~who were terminated more than 90 days ' before the ~ 
&:.--·~ 
filing of the charge. The DC accepted the airlines' argument___...__., 
that the timely-filing requirement was jurisdictional, but found 
that there was a "continuing violation." Three days after that 
order the DC granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on 
~ ~- -------------------~----~----
the basis that the airlines' policy of firing or grounding 
mothers, but not fathers, violated T. VII. Then the plaintiffs 
. . . 
--2-
settled with American Airlines, the settlement was upheld, and 
cert. was denied. TWA appealed the S.J. and that's what got them 
into this mess. The 1978 decision by the CA 7 (78-1545) upheld 
the finding that~ "no-mothers" policy violated T. VII but C/1 7 
reversed the finding that there was a continuing violation. ~ 
~--------~--------------~----~~~ 
Because the CA7 also believed timely filing of a complaint was 4 
' f3u;:f- <:: 4 7 
jurisdictional, it expressly did not consider the argument that 
TWA might have waived the defense of statute of limitations by 
failing to assert it for four years. Accordingly the judgment 
was reversed as to 92% of the plaintiff class. While petitions 
for cert were pending, the parties settled. 
With this background--! think you can avoid the Franks-Evans 
'? 7 
problems that concerned Justices White, Marshall and Powell in ' 1 .I 
, ~
this case. pel~~ 
There was a finding and that finding ~ 
o-1 
was upheld insofar as t e the court found that the "no-mothers"~ 
policy violated T. VII. The CA7 reversed as to 92% of the ~ ~c 
~~4 plaintiffs solely on the basis of the defense that the charges 
11 ~ p( 
were untimely. (We, in turn have reversed the CA7 on the effect
of the untimeliness )reopening th~ossibility that it would 




because · the Airline waived it by its failure to assert it for 
four years and/or its explicit waiver in the 1971 settlement.) 
At any rate, that def e nse, even as ~ uming that it is meritorious, 
~~ 
does not affect the fact that the non-plaintiff union members ~.7 
JL '' /( were unjustly enriched by the employer's discriminatory practice. --------------





~~~ . ,_ -'-~~ 
d the other union ~me~~o~.~~ 
-3-
continued to accrue seniority 
.~ .A • ~~~--'{ 
either be unhired or woul ave less seniority. Si ~s~ 
this unjust enrichmen that underpins the Court's op
Franks, see 424 U.S. at 776, there is no basis for re~/ ~ 
use of the retroactive-seniority remedy the Court appr~f~ ~ 
there, in this case. This makes this a very unique ca
is no occassion to reach the issue in this case of whet~~ 
Franks remedy is appropriate in the usual settlement si
where there has been no finding of liability--e.g. where the 
are unsettled questions of fact or law which could res 
finding that the practice itself was not discriminator~ 
This is, in essence, the reasoning of the CA7 whe~ ~~ 
the American Airlines settlement.· There the court notetf YJ;:r'{i o ~ 
they dealt with a case where settlement followed summar~~~ 
judgment and the plaintiffs had almost earned through ful~~ 
litigation the remedy proposed in Franks. See Airline Stewards & 
Stewardesses Ass'n v. American Airlines, Inc., 573 F.2d 960, 964-
5 n.9 (1978). The only difference between that case and this one 
is that there the CA7 had not yet passed on the timeliness issue 
so ~he question of whether the plaintiffs' claims were timely was 
unsettled. In essence, however, this issue was also unsettled in 
this case since petitions for cert. were pending and the CA7 had 
decided the issue differently than every other circuit. 
I don't think Evans is really a problem to this approach. 
The Court held in Evans that a violation which is not the subject 
of a timely claim is in effect not really a violation and can 
not, therefore, be a basis for seeking retroactive seniority when 
• -4-
the employer voluntarily rehires a discriminatee. Although the 
dissent, which you joined, has a valid argument, it seems that 
all the Court really did was to enforce the statute of 
limitations. The Court said explicitly, in distinguishing 
Franks, that it dealt only with the issue of whether there was a 
violation and did not reach any remedy issue. 431 u.s., at 559. 
meb 12/12/81 
To: Mr. Justice Powell December 12, 1981 
From: Mary 
In Re: No. 78-1545, Ann Zipes, et al. v. TWA, Inc. & 
No. 80-951, Independent Federation of Flight Attendants 
I remain troubled by the Franks-Evans problems presented in 
this case. The waiver, if any, was by TWA, not the Union or its 
members, none of whom ~guilty of any discriminatory acts. In 
any event, the waiver issue disappears if the settlement order is 
affirmed because it included an explict waiver for purposes of 
settlement. The question remains, however, whether, in awarding 
retroactive seniority to the pltf-class in the seniority-award 
order, the DC erred in awarding that relief under the standard of 
Franks v. Bowman. I believe that an award of such relief under that 
standard is inconsistent with United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 
u.s. 553 (1977) and unfair to current employees who worked the 
unpopular flights to earn their seniority while the pltf-class slept 
on their rights. 
In Evans, the fact that the airline had discriminated 




resign in 1968 by the company's policy that stewardesses could not 
be married, though stewards could be. And the CA7 had held that the 
policy violated Title VII. See Sporgis v. United Air Lines, 444 F. 
2d 1194 (1977), cert. denied, 404 u.s. 991 (1971). 
Yet, in Evans, the Court held that §703(h)--not just the 
filing requirement, as suggested in the memo sent by Justice 
~
Brennan--precluded any grant of seniority based on Evans' --
termination. The pltf argued that the refusal to give her the 
seniority she would have had but for the act of discrimination was a 
continuing violation of Title VII and that she should, therefore, be 
able to file a charge now alleging this discrimination and receive --the seniority she would have had but for the past disciminatoy act. 
In considering whether there was a continuing violation, 
the Court rejected the argument that Franks v. Bowman, 424 u.S.747 
(1976) supported the award of seniority to the pltf. The Court 
explained that Franks only dealt with the appropriate remedy after 
there had been findings of discrimination and of a timely charge: 
"When that case reached this Court, the issues relating to 
the timeliness of the charge and the violation of Title 
VII had already been decided; we dealt only with a 
question of remedy. In contrast, in the the case now 
before us, we do not reach an remedy issue because 
respondent did no ile a timely c arge ased on her 1968 
separat1on and she as no a e e acts establishing a 
violation since she was rehired in 1972." Id., at 559 
(footnotes ommitted). --
Thus, in Evans, the Court indicated that there were two 
prerequisites to the award of retroactive seniority under the Franks 
standard: a violation and a timely charge. 
After thus explaining that the Court in Franks had been 
solely co~rned with remedy, the Evans Court went on to explain that 
3. 
§703(h) 1 "highlighted" the "difference between a remedy issue and a 
violation issue." Id. The Court noted that: 
"As we held in [Franks], by its terms that section does 
not bar the award of retroactive seniority after a 
violation has been proved. Rather, §703(h) 'delineates 
which employment practices are illegal and thereby 
prohibited and which are not.'" 431 u.s., at 553 (quoting 
424 U.S., at 758)." 
The Court then held that past discriminatory acts could not form the 
basis for a challenge to a neutral, non-discriminatory seniority 
system: 
"But ••. a challenge to a neutral system may not be 
predicated on the fact that a past event which has no 
present legal significance has affected the calculation of 
seniority credit, even if the past event might at one time 
have justified a valid claim against the employer. A 
contrary view would substitute a claim for seniortiy 
credit for almost every claim which is barred by 
limitations. Such a result would contravene the mandate 
of §703(h)." 431 u.s., at 560. 
Thus, in Evans, the Court held that, in the absence of a finding of 
a timely charge and a violation of Title VII, "the mandate of 
§703(h)" barred an award of seniority inconsistent with a neutral, 
nondiscriminatory, seniority system. 
In the case at bar, it is true that there was once a 
finding of a timely charge, but that finding had been overruled by 
1Title VII, §703(h), 42 u.s.c. 703(h): 
.. 
>' 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it 
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to apply different standards of compensation, or 
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ••• 
provided that such differences are not the result of an 
intention to disciminate because of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin •.•• " 
the CA7 prior to the entry of the seniority-award order by the DC. 
The two prerequisites for relief under Franks were not, therefore, 
met. 
4 0 
In Evans, the Court stated that a pltf had no right to an 
order awarding retroactive seniority if the requirements of a timely 
charge and a violation of Title VII had not been met. But in the 
case at bar, if we affirm the seniority-award order, we would hold 
that if the employer--who has no interest in who receives 
competitive-status seniority--agrees to allow a DC to award such 
seniorty retroactively in a settlement, the DC can award the 
seniority under the Franks standard without finding that timely 
charges have been filed. In other words, although a pltf has no 
right to such relief under such circumstances because of the 
"mandate of §703(h) ," a pltf can be given such relief by a court 
provided the employer does not object. 
If that is true, the "mandate of §703(h)" protects neutral 
seniority systems only when the employer--not the union or the 
beneficiaries of the system--considers protection appropriate. 
Although competitive-status seniority rights are not vested property 
rights beyond the remedial scope of Title VII, see Franks, 424 U.S., 
at 778, such rights are determined by a contract between the 
employer and the union and are not amenable to unilateral change by 
the employer at the request of third parties. When such rights are 
adjusted by a Court awarding relief under the Franks standard, the 
court has found a violation of Title VII and a timely charge and the 
adjustment is ordered to make the victims whole. The award is 
justified by the fact that the current employees are merely being 
~·· 
5. 
placed in the positions they would have been, relative to the 
victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. 
When there has been no finding of a past violation of the 
Act, the situation is, of course, otherwise, and the Conference 
would apparently agree that retroactive competitive-status seniority 
should not be awarded under the fairly automatic standard of Franks. 
When there has been no filing of a timely charge, an award 
of retroactive competitive-status seniorty is necessarily unfair to 
~ 
current, innocent employees. It is argued that current employees 
l ( 
have no ground for objecting because they have been unjustly ,, 
enriched by the employer's discriminatory practice. During the 
years the pltf-class slept on its rights, however, these employees 
worked the unpopular flights in order to accrue seniority. That 
seniority is something they have earned, not a bonus unjustly or 
arbitrarily given to them rather than another. The pltf-class, on 
the other hand, has neither (1) worked for the right to retroactive 
compeitive-status seniority nor (2) shown that they are entitled to 
an award of such seniority because they were discriminated against 
and have filed timely charges. If such seniority is nevertheless 
awarded to them under the standard of Franks, it is they who are 
unjustly enriched at the expense of other employee who worked to 
earn their seniority. Moreover, employers will be able to settle 
Title VII actions by bargaining away the rights of others. 2 
2It is true that it is the DC, not the employer, that actually 
entered the order awarding seniority. But if employers and pltfs 
know that such awards will be available under the standard of Franks 
provided the employer agrees, the employer will be able to use chips 
belonging to current employees in settling lawsuits with Title VII 
Footnote continued on next page. 
I think the DC court erred in applying the Franks 
standard, 3 in awarding competitive status seniority. In awarding 
6. 
such relief pursuant to a settlement, a DC should carefully consider 
the equities of the situation. If the settlement includes a waiver 
of a time-bar, the DC should nevertheless consider whether it is 
unfair to award retroactive competitive-status seniority to pltfs 
who slept on their rights while others worked to earn their 
seniority. 
pltfs. 
3Although the DC did not cite Franks, it did award relief 
under the Franks standard: "full restoration of retroactive 
seniority w1ll not have an unusual adverse impact upon currrently 
employed flight attendants in a manner which is not typical of other 







.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,.JR. 
Dear Bill: 
~u:prtntt <!fttttrl tt! tlft ~th ~taits-
2tas-Irittgtcn.l9. Of. 2.0~.l1~ 
December 14, 1981 
80-951 Independent Federation v. TWA 
Thank you for circulating a copy of Mary Mikva's 
interesting memo of December 8. It is a helpful summary of 
the sitatuion. 
At Conference, we were all together - as I recall 
- in 78-1545, but less harmonious with respect to the claim 
of the union in 80-951. Although I still am not entirely at 
rest, my concern as to the validity of the grant of 
retroactive competitive seniority remains. 
I have not yet found any holding that TWA, prior 
to the settlement that is here at issue, waived the statute 
of limitations issue. Even if TWA may be said to have 
waived it as a part of the settlement, it is not at all 
clear to me that the present contract between TWA and 
respondent Union can be changed unilaterally by TWA at the 
request of third parties in a settlement negotiation. 
This is quite different from Franks v. Bowman, 
where the Court had found both a violat1on of T1tle VII and 
timely filing of charges. The Court then awarded relief on 
the theory that the current employees were merely being 
placed in the position they would have been, relative to the 
victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. Two 
elements had been found to exist: discrimination and timely 
charges. Here, admittedly subclass B had not filed timely 
claims. In fact, many of their claims were several years 
old. Thus, in the absence of a waiver (and I am not 
saisf ied there was a valid waiver as to the union) ·, one of 
the essential elements of Bowman is absent. 
Nor can I agree that the employees who took the 
places of the subclass B employees are "unjustly enriched". 
They are not strike breakers. Rather, they are innocent 
employees who - in many instances - have worked for years on 










seniority. This is now something they have · earned, not a 
bonus unjustly accrued. 
2. 
In sum, if I understand this case correctly, an 
employer attempted to settle a Title VII action in part by 
bargaining away the rights of others. This seems unfair, 
and unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary that 
I have not yet identified, I remain inclined to dissent on 
this issue. I acknowledge, however, that from the outset 




cc: The Conference 
December 14, 1981 
80-951 Independent Federation v. TWA 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you for circulating a copy of Mary Mikva's 
interesting memo of December 8. It is a helpful summary of 
the sitatuion. 
At Conference, we were all together - as I recall 
- in 78-1545, but less harmonious with respect to the claim 
of the union in 80-951. Although t still arn not entirely at 
rest, my concern as to the validity of the grant of 
retroactive competitive seniority remains. 
I have not yet found anv holdtng that TWA, orior 
to the settlement that is here at issue, waived the statute 
of limitations issue. Even if TWA may be said to have 
waived it as a part of the settlement, it is not at.. all 
clear to me that the present contract between TWA and 
respondent Union can be changed unilaterally by TWA at the 
request of third parties in a settlement negotiation. 
This is quite different from Franks v. Bowman, 
where the court had found both a violation of Title VII and 
timely filing of charges. The Court then awarded relief on 
the theory that the current employees were merely being 
placed in the position they would have been, relative to the 
victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. Two 
elements had been found to exist: discrimination and timely 
charges. Here, admittedly subclass B had not filed timely 
claims. In fact, many of their claims were several years 
old. Thus, in the absence of a waiver (and I am not 
saisfied there was a valid waiver as to the union), one of 
the essential elements of Bowman is absent. 
Nor can I agree that the employees who took the 
places of the subclass B employees are "unjustly enriched". 
They are not strike breakers. Rather, they are innocent 
employees who - in many instances - have worked for years on 
unpopular flights in order to accrue their present 
,l • 
! 
seniority. This is now something they have earned, not a 
bonus unjustly accrued. 
2. 
In sum, if I understand this case correctly, an 
employer attempted to settle a Title VII action in part by 
bargaining away the rights of others. This seems unfair, 
and unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary that 
I have not yet identified, I remain inclined to dissent on 
this issue. I acknowledge, however, that from the outset 
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flying. After collective bargaining eliminated the challenged 
practice prospectively, the parties in the case reached a ten-
tative settlement. The settlement, which provided neither 
backpay nor retroactive seniority, was approved by the Dis-
trict Court. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
however, found the union to be an inadequate representative 
of the class because of the inherent conflict between the in-
terests of current and former employees. It remanded the 
case with instructions that the District Court name individual 
members of the class to replace ALSSA as the class repre-
sentative.1 Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Associa-
tion v. American Airlines Inc., 490 F. 2d 636 (CA7 1973). 
Upon remand, petitioners in No. 7~1545 were appointed 
as class representatives. TWA moved to amend its answer 
to assert that the claims of plaintiffs and other class members 
were barred by Title VII's "statute of limitations" because 
they had failed to file charges with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the statutory time 
limit. 1 App. 89a. 2 Although the District Court granted 
the motion to amend, it noted that the "delay in pleading the 
defense of limitations may ultimately constitute a waiver of 
the defense." 1 App. lOla. 
Subsequently, on October 15, 1976, the District Court de-
nied TWA's motion to exclude class members who had not 
filed timely charges with the EEOC. In support of its mo-
1 The class was defined as all female flight cabin attendants who were 
terminated from employment with TWA on or after July 2, 1965 for rea-
sons of pregnancy. The Court of Appeals assumed the class to include 
only those who would have resumed flight duty after becoming a mother 
but for TWA's policy forbidding this. In re Consolidated Proceedings in 
the Airline Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142, 1147 and n. 9 (CA7 1978). The class 
thus included both former employees and current employees, that is both 
those who declined and those who accepted ground positions. 
2 When this suit was filed, 42 U.S. C. §2000e-5(d) (1970 ed.) required 
charges to be filed within 90 days after the alleged unlawful employment 
practice occurred. In 1972, this section was amended to extend the time 
limit to 180 days and was renumbered § 2000e-5(e). 
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tion, TWA argued that instead of an affirmative defense anal-
ogous to a statute of limitations, timely filing with the EEOC 
was a jurisdictional prerequisite not subject to waiver by any 
action of the defendants. While the District Court agreed 
that the filing requirements of Title VII are jurisdictional, it 
denied the motion on the basis that any violation by the air-
lines continued against all the class members until the airline 
changed the challenged policy. 1 App. 131a-32a. On Octo-
ber 18, 1974, the District Court granted the motion of the 
plaintiff class for summary judgment on the issue of TWA's 
liability for violating Title VII. 1 App. 134a. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of October 18, 
1976, granting summary judgment on liability, expressly 
holding that "TWA's no motherhood policy . . . provides a 
clear example of the discrimination prohibited by 
§ 2000e-2(a)." In re Consolidated Proceedings in the Air-
line Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142, 1145 (CA7 1978). It declined, 
however, "to extend the continuing violation theory, as did 
the district court, so as to include in the plaintiff class those 
employees who were permanently terminated more than 90 
days before the filing of EEOC charges." ld., at 1149. 
The Court ~f App_eals went on to hold that timel~ filing of 
EEOC charge§.....was a jurisdictional prerequisite. Because 
TWA could not wa1ve tfie timely ffilng requirement, the 
Court o~und that approximately 92% of the plain-
tiffs' claims were jursidictionally barred by the failure of 
those plaintifffs to have filed charges of discrimination with 
the EEOC within 90 days the alleged unlawful employment 
practice. The Court of Appeals, however, stayed its man-
date pending the filing of petitions in this Court. Petitions 
for certiorari were filed by the plaintiff class, No. 78-1545, 
and by TWA, No. 78-1749. This Court granted a motion to 
defer consideration of the petitions pending completion of set-
tlement proceedings in the District Court. Pet. App. No. 
80-951, at 3a. 
In connection with the settlement proceedings, the District 
\.I 
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Court designated two subclasses. Subclass A, consisting of 
some 30 women, comprised those who were terminated on or 
after March 2, 1970, as well as those who were discharged 
earlier, but who had accepted reinstatement in ground duty 
positions. Subclass B, numbering some 400 women, covered 
all other members of the class and consisted of those whose 
claims the Court of Appeals had found to be jurisdictionally 
barred for failure to satisfy the timely filing requirement. 2 
J.A. 3. 
The proposed settlem~nt divided three million dollars be-
tween the two groups. It also provided each class member 
with full company and union seniority from the date of termi-
nation. The agreement specified that "in the event of the 
timely objection of any interested person, it is agreed that 
the amount of seniority and credit for length of service for the 
compensation period will be determined by the Court in its 
discretion, pursuant to the provisions of Section ~' 3 and 
all other applicable provisions of law, without contest or 
objection by TWA." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 80--951, p. 
29a. 
The Independent Federation of Flight Attendents (union), 
which had replaced ALSSA as the collective bargaining agent 
for the flight attendants, was permitted to intervene and to 
object to the settlement. On the basis that the Court of Ap-
peals had not issued the mandate in its jurisdictional decision, 
the District Court rejected the union's challenge to its juris-
diction over Subclass B. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 
8 Section !06(g) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976 ed) provides: 
"If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is 
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the 
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such un-
lawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be 
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hir-
ing of employees, with or without back pay ... , or any other equitable re-
lief as the court deems appropriate." 
1 
• 
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8~951, p. 15a. After holding three days of hearing, the Dis- jj L ~ 
trict C~_~o_yed tb~t and awarded com~ti-
tive semonty. It explicitly found that full restoration of ret-
r~iority would not have an unusual adverse impact 
upon currently employed flight attendants in any way atypi-
cal of Title VII cases. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 8~951, 
p. 18a-19a. 
The union appealed. It argued that, because of the Court 
of Appeals' earlier opinion, the District Court lacked jurisdic-
tion to approve the settlement or order retroactive seniority 
with respect to Subclass B. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 
reasoning that "the principles favoring settlement of class ac-
tion law suits remain the same regardless of whether the dis-
puted legal issues center on the jurisdiction of the court over 
the action." Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Associa-
tion, Local550 v. Trans World Airlines, 630 F. 2d 1164, 1169 
(CA 7 1980). It further explained that the question of juris-
diction as to Subclass B had not been finally determined be-
cause a challenge to its decision was pending before this 
Court and that the Courts of Appeals were split on the issue. 
The Court of Appeals noted that the district court clearly had 
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of Subclass A. It 
concluded, "Where, as here, the jurisdictional question is not 
settled with finality, parties should not be forced to litigate 
the issue of jurisdiction if they can arrive at a settlement that 
is otherwise appropriate for district court approval." I d., at 
1167. 
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the award of seniority. 
According to the court, the settlement served the public pol-
icy of remedying past acts of sex discrimination and the con-
sequences of those past act. Moreover, "the right to have its 
objections heard does not, of course, give the intervenor the 
right to block any settlement to which it objects." lbid. 4 
'The Court of Appeals relied on language in Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 780 (1976): 
lj 
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The union petitioned for certiorari, No. 80-951. We 
granted its petition together with the petition in No. 78-1545 
and No. 78-1549, -- U.S. --, but later removed the 
TWA case, No. 78-1549,5 from the argument docket and lim-
ited the grant in No. 80-951. -- U. S. --. 
II 
The ~ingle question inN~ 7§-1545 is wh~er the timely 
filing of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
bringing a Title VII suit in federal court orwlieiller the re-
quirement is subject to waiver and estoppel. In reaching its 
decision that the requirement is jurisdictional, the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on its reading of the 
statutory language, the absence of any indication to the con-
trary in the legislative history, and references in several of 
our cases to the 90-day filing requirement as "jurisdic-
tional." 6 Other Courts of Appeals that have examined the 
same materials have reached the opposite conclusion. 7 
[D]istrict courts should take as their starting point the presumption in 
favor of rightful-place seniority relief, and proceed with further legal anal-
ysis from that point; and that such relief may not be denied on the abstract 
basis of adverse impact upon interests of other employees but rather only 
on the basis of unusual adverse impact arising from facts and circumstances 
that would not be generally found in Title VII cases. 
5 In No. 78-1549, TWA contends (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in 
affirming summary judgment for plaintiffs on the issue of liability, (b) that 
TWA should be required only to grant prospective relief to plaintiffs, and 
(c) that the Court of Appeals erred in defining the subclass of plaintiffs who 
had filed timely charges with the EEOC. In view of our decision in No. 
78-1545 and No. 80-951, we now dismiss the petition in No. 78-1549 as im-
providently granted. 
6 See International Union of Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, 
429 U. S. 229 (1976); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 555, 
n. 4; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36,47 (1974); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798 (1973). 
7 See Carlile v. South Routt School District Re 3-J, 652 F. 2d 981 (CAlO 
1981); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F. 2d 584 (CA5 
1981); Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F. 2d 255 (CA61979); Hart v. 
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We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with 
the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prere uisite to suit in fed-
eral court, but a reqmrement that, li e a statute of limita-
tions, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. 8 
The structure of Title VII, the congressional policy underly-
ing it, and the reasoning of our cases all lead to this 
conclusion. 
The provision granting district courts jurisdiction under 
Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e) and (f) (1974), does not 
limit jurisdiction to those cases in which there has been a 
timely finding with the EEOC. 9 It contains no reference to 
the timely filing requirement. The provision specifying the 
time for filing charges with the EEOC appears as an entirely 
J.T. Baker Chemical Co., 598 F . 2d 829 (CA 31979); Laffey v. Northwest 
Airlines, Inc., 567 F. 2d 429 (CADC 1976). 
8 0ne of the questions on which we granted certiorari in No. 80-951 was 
whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's ap-
proval of the settlment of jurisdictionally barred claims. In reaching its 
decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explicitly declined to 
follow McArthur v. Sourthern Airway, 569 F. 2d 276 (CA51978) (en bane). 
In McArthur, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the ap-
proval of a settlement agreement in a Title VII class action, holding that 
the District Court lacked jurisdiction because no plaintiff had filed a timely 
charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Because of our holding in No. 
7&-1545 that timely filing with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite, this issue need not be resolved. 
9 42 U. S. C. 2000e-5(0(3), for example, reads: 
"Every United States district court and each United States court of a place 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of 
actions brought under this subchapter. Such an action may be brought in 
any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice 
is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the em-
ployment records relevant to such practice are maintained and adminis-
tered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have 
worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the re-
spondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be 
brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his princi-
pal office." 
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separate provision, and it does not speak in jurisdictional 
tenns or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the the dis-
trict courts. 10 The legislative history of the filing provision is 
sparse, but Senator Humphrey did characterize the time pe-
riod for filing a claim as a "period of limitations," 110 Cong. 
Rec. 12723, and Senator Case described its purpose as pre-
venting the pressing of "stale" claims, 110 Cong. Rec. 7243, 
the end served by a statute of limitations. 
Although subsequent legislative history is not dispostive, 
see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 686 n. 7 
(1979); Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 
U. S. 572, 596 (1980), the legislative history of the 1972 
amendments also indicates that Congress intended the filing 
period to operate as a statute of limitations instead of a juris-
dictional requirement. In the Final Conference Committee 
section-by-section analysis of H. R. 1745, The Equal Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, 118 Cong. Rec. 7166, 7167, the Committee 
not only termed the filing period a "time limitation," but 
explained: 
"This subsection as amended provides that charges be 
filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment 
practice. Court decisions under the present law have 
shown an inclination to interpret this time limitation so 
as to give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of 
the law; it is not intended that such court decisions 
should be in any way circumsribed by the extension of 
the time limitations in this subsection." 11 
10 Section 2000e-5(e) (1976) reads simply: "A charge under this section 
shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful 
employment practice occurred .... " 
11 The Senate Labor Comittee's Section by Section analysis of the 1972 
Amendments explained that "[t]his subsection would permit ... a limita-
tion period similar to that contained in the Labor-Management Relations 
Act, as amended." Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 65-&3 (1971). We 
have recognized that the Labor Act was "the model for Title VII's remedial 
provisons," International Brotherlwod of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
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This result is entirely consistent with prior case law. Al-
though our cases contain scattered reference to the timely fil-
ing requirement as jurisdictional, the legal character of the 
requirement was not at issue in those case, and as often or 
more often in the same or other cases, we have referred to 
the provision as a limitations statute. 12 More weighty infer-
U. S. 324, 366 (1977). Because the time requirement for filing an unfair 
labor practice charge under the NLRA operates as a statute of limitations 
subject to recognized equitable doctrines and not a restriction of the juris-
diction of the National Labor Relations Board, see NLRB v. Local 26;4, 
Laborer's Int'l Union, 529 F. 2d 778, 781-785 (CA8 1976); Shumate v. 
NLRB, 452 F. 2d 717, 270 (CA4 1971); NLRB v. A. E. Nettleton Co., 241 
F. 2d 130, 133 (CA21957); NLRB v.Itasco Cotton Mfg. Co., 179 F. 2d 504, 
506-507 (CA5 1950), the time limitations under Title VII should be treated 
likewise. 
Moreover, when Congress in 1978 revised the filing requirement of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C.§§ 621 et seq., 
which was modeled after Title VII, see Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 
U. S. 750 (1979), the House Conference report explicitly stated that "the 
'charge' requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining an 
action under the ADEA and that therefore equitable modification for fail-
ing to file within the time period will be available to plaintiffs under this 
Act." House Conference Report No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 12, re-
printed in 1978 U. S. Code Cong & Admin. News 504, 534 (footnote 
omitted). 
12 As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit points out in its opinion in 
Coke, supra, at 5~89, references to the filing requirement as a statute 
of limitations have come to dominate in our opinions: 
"The trend of the Supreme Court cases is also significant. In the early 
cases, the Court in dicta referred to such time provisions using the label 
"jurisdictional prerequisite." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U. S. 792 ... (1973); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 ... 
(1974). In the 1976 Robbins & Myers decision the jurisdictional label was 
used once, but there were numerous references to "tolling the limitations 
period, "429 U. S. at 239, ... and other labels obviously referring to a 
statute of limitations, as opposed to subject matter jurisdiction. See also 
United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, ... (1977), in which both labels 
are used. From and after late 1977, all nine justices have concurred in 
opinions containing dicta using the limitations label to the exclusion of the 
jurisdictional label. Occidental Life Insurance Company v. EEOC, 432 
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ences are to be drawn from other cases, however. Franks 
v. ~Bowm~n Jransp_ortation Co., Inc., 424 U. S. 747 (1976), 
was a Tille VII suit agi}nst an employer and a union. The 
District Court denied relief for unnamed class members on 
the ground that those individuals had not filed administrative 
charges under the provisions of Title VII and that relief for 
them was thus not appropriate. The Court of Appeals did 
not disturb this ruling, but we reversed, saying, 
"The District Court stated two reasons for its denial of 
seniority relief for the unnamed class members. The 
first was that those individuals had not filed adminis-
trative charges under the provision of Title VII with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and there-
fore class relief of this sort was not appropriate. We re-
jected this justification for denial of class-based relief in 
the context of backpay awards in Albemarle Paper, [422 
U. S. 405 (1975)] and ... reject it here. This justifica-
tion for denying class-based relief in Title VII suits has 
been unanimously rejected by the courts of appeals, and 
Congress ratified that construction by the 1972 amend-
ments." 424 U. S., at 771. 
If the timely filing requirement limits the jurisdiction of 
the district court to those claimants who have filed timely 
charges with the EEOC, the district courts in Franks and 
Abemarle would have been without jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the claims of those who had not filed as well as without juris-
diction to award them seniority. We did not so hold. Fur-
thermore, we noted that Congress had approved the Court of 
Appeals cases that awarded relief to class members who had 
not exhausted administrative remedies before the EEOC. 
It is evident that in doing so, Congress necessarily adopted 
the view that the provision for filing charges with the EEOC 
U. S. 355, 371--372, ... (1977); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 
U. S. 385, 391--391 ... (1980); Delaware State College v. Ricks,- U. S. 
-, ... (1980). 
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should not be construed to erect a jurisdictional prerequisite 
to suit in the District Court. 
In Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522 (1972), we an-
nounced a guiding principle for construing the provisions of 
Title VII. Declining to read literally another filing provision 
of Title VII, we explained that a technical reading would be 
"particularly inappropriate in a statuory scheme in which lay-
men, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process." 
404 U. S., at 527. That principle must be applied here as 
well. 
The reasoning of other cases assumes that the filing re-
quirement is not jurisdictional. In International Union of 
Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, 429 U. S. 229 
(1976), we rejected the argument that the timely filing re-
quirement should be tolled because the plaintiff had been 
pursuing a grievance procedure set up in the collective bar-
gaining agreement. We did not reach this decision on on the 
basis that the 180 day period was jurisdictional. Instead, we 
considered the merits of a series of arguments that grievance 
procedures should toll the requirement. Such reasoning 
would have been gratuitous if the filing requirement were a 
jurisdictional prerequisite. 13 
Similarly, we did not sua sponte dismiss the action in 
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807 (1980) on the basis 
that the district court lacked jurisdiction because of plaintiff's 
failure to comply with a related Title VII time provision. In-
stead, we merely observed in a footnote that "[p]etitioner did 
'
8 In Robbins & Myers, we also held that the expanded 180 "limitations 
period," enacted by the 1972 amendments, was retroactive. This holding 
presupposes that the requirement is not jurisdictional. Moreover, in 
reaching this conclusion, we quoted from Chase Securities Corp. v. Don-
aldson, 325 U. S. 304, 315-316 (1945): "[C]ertainly it cannot be said that 
lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost 
through mere lapse of time is per se an offense against the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Several circuit courts have read Robbins & Myers as im-
plicitly approving equitable tolling. Coke, supra; Hart, supra; Smith v. 
American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F. 2d 102, 108-109 (CA2 1978). 
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not assert respondent's failure to file the action within 90 
days as a defense." 447 U. S., at 811, n. 9. 
By holding compliance with the filing period not to be a ju-
risdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a re-
quirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so 
requires, we honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as 
a whole without negating the particular purpose of the filing 
requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer. 
We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals in No. 78-1545. 
III 
In No. 80-951, the Union challenges on several grounds 
the District Court's authority to award, over the Union's 
objection, retroactive seniority to the members of Subclass 
B. We have already rejected the Union's first contention, 
namely, the District Court had no jurisdiction to award relief 
to those who had not complied with Title VII's filing require-
ment. The Union also contends that in any event there has 
been no finding of d18Cr"lmf a i n "th respect to Class B 
mem ers an t at the predicate for relie under § 706(g) is 
therefore missing. This contention is also without merit. 
The District Court unquestiona ly found an unlawful dis-
crimination against the plaintiff class, as a whole, and the 
class at that time had not been subdivided into Subclasses A 
and B. Summary ~ent ran in favor _9f the entire class, 
including 5oth tfiose memoers ""WilO""had filed timely Charges 
and those who had not. '!'he Court of Appeals affirmed the 
sl!!!!mary j_u<!gm~~  as well as tneiillilfng of a diSCrimi-
natoryempiOyrnentpiactice. The court went on, however, 
to hold that the District Court had no jurisdiction over claims 
by those who had not met the filing requirement and that 
those individuals should have been excluded from the class <¥-
prior to the grant of summary judgment. But as we have 
now held, that ruling is erroneous. The District Court dig 
h~e jurisdiction over non-filing class memoer~. Thus, there 
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with respect to the entire class. With the reversal of the 
Court of Appeals judgment in No. 7S-1545 and our dismissal 
of No. 7S-1549, which had challenged the affirmance of the 
summary judgment order, the order that found class-wide 
discrimination remains intact an 1s na . e a war of ret-
roactive seniority to memoers of SUbclass B as well as Sub-
class A is not infirm for want of a finding of a discriminatory 
employment practice. 
Equally meritless is the union's contention that retroactive 
seniority contrary~ the collective bargaining agreement 
should not be awarded over the objection of a union that has 
not itself been found guilty of discrimination. In Franks v. 
Bowmq..n, 424 U. S. 747, 764 (1976) we read the legislative 
history of Title VII as giving 
"emphatic confirmation that federal courts are empow-
ered to fashion such relief as the particular circum-
stances of a case may require to effect restitution, mak-
ing whole in so far as possible the victims of . . . 
discrimination . . . . " 
While recognizing that back pay was the only remedy specifi-
cally mentioned in the provision, we reasoned that without a 
seniority remedy adequate relief might be denied. We con-
cluded that the class-based seniority relief for identifiable vic-
tims of illegal discrimination is a form of relief generally ap-
propriate under § 706(g). 
In Franks, the District Court had found both that the em-
ployer had engaged in discrimination and that the discrimina-
tory practices were perpetuated in the collective bargaining 
agreements with the unions. 424 U. S., at 751. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 
324 (1977), however, makes it clear that once there has een 
a findin o discrimination the em o er, an award of ret-
roactive seniority 1s a ro riate even if there is no fin ing 
that t e umon as also ille all 1scnmin ted. In Team-
1es agree to a decree which provided that the 
78-1545, 78-1549 & 80-951-0PINION 
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District Court would decide "whether any discriminatees 
should be awarded additional equitable relief such as retroac-
tive seniority." 431 U. S., at 330, n. 4. Although we held 
that the union had not violated Title VII by agreeing to and 
maintaining the seniority system, we nonetheless directed 
the union to remain in the litigation as a defendant so that full 
relief could be awarded the victims of the employers post-act 
discrimination. 431 U ... s., at 356, n. 43. 14 Here, as in 
Teamsters, the settlement left to the District Court the final 
decision as to retroactive seniority. 
In resolving the seniority issue, the District Court gave 
the union all the process that was due it under Title VII in 
our cases. The union was allowed to intervene. The Dis-
trict Court heard its objections, made appropriate findings, 
and determined that retroactive seniority should be awarded. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with that determination, and 
we have eliminated from our consideration here the question 
whether on the facts of this case the Court of Appeals and the 
District Court were in error in this respect. 
Accordingly, the judgment in 7~1545 is reversed and the 
judgment in 80-951 is affirmed. 
So ordered. 
" In noting that the union in Teamsters properly remained a defendant in 
the litigation, we cited to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(a). The union in this 
case was not joined under Rule 19 when individuals replaced the union as 
class representatives, but intervened later. Cf. EEOC v. MacMillan 
Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1974) (joinder under 
Rule 19(a) provides union with full opportunity to participate in the litiga-
tion and the formulation of proposed relief, although as practical matter 
union not play role in litigation until court finds violation of Title VII). 
~-~~~ 
meb 01/04/82 ~ ~ 
ry~ 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Mary 
In Re: Nos. 78-1549 & 80-951, Zipes v. TWA 
The opinion is written fairly narrowly. As an alternative 
to dissenting on the implications of United Air Lines v. Evans, it 
might be possible either to concurr specially, narrowing the opinion 
just a little further, or to suggest a slightly narrower approach to 
section III to Justice White. 
As expected, the opinion is not entirely consistent with 
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 u.s. 553 (1977). Section II is 
~/----
not actually inconsistent, since it holds only that there was no --
lack of jurisdiction, not that an award of competitive status 
seniority was appropriate as a matter of substantive Title VII law. 
The language, especially at p.lO, requires careful reading to 
perceive this distinction, and Evans is never explicitly 
distinguished. A footnote explaining the distinction might be 
helpful. 
The third section is more troubling. The good thing is that ------------- --- -- -
the holding is limited to instances in which there has been a final 
finding of discrimination. There is, as we discussed earlier, a 




there has been 
explained that Franks v. Bowman, 424 u.s. 
with the appropriate remedy after there had been findings of 
discrimination and of a timely charge: 
"When that case reached this Court, the issues relating to 
the timeliness of the charge and the violation of Title 
VII had already been decided; we dealt only with a 
question of remedy. In contrast, in the the case now 
before us, we do not reach any remedy issue because 
respondent did not file a timely charge based on her 1968 
separation and she has not alleged facts establishing a 
violation since she was rehired in 1972." Id., at 559 
(footnotes ommitted). --
Thus, in Evans, the Court indicated that there were two 
erequisites to the award of retroactive seniority under 
standard: a violation and a timely charge. 
It would be possible to affirm the courts below on the 
narrow ground that there has been, in this cas~ final finding of 
a timely charg final finding of discrimination. 
At the top of 13, the opinion explains that, given the 
disposition of the various appeals, the DC order finding 
discrimination "remains intact and is final." This "final and 
intact" finding is an October 18, 1976, summary-judgment order which 
holds that the no-motherhood policy did violate Title VII. It is 
final and "intact" (without any remand) with regard to the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of subclass B because the CA7 stayed its 
mandate of its decision affirming the grant of summary judgment on 
the merits, but holding that the claims of subclass B were 
jurisdictionally out of time. 
By that standard of "final and intact" (order not actually 







intact" order that subclass B did file timely cl~ims (using a 
"continuing-violation"-by-failure-to-re-hire theory) . That order 
is reprinted in petn no. 78-1545, at A21. It was entered on Oct. 
15, 1976, three days before entry of summary judgment, and the two 
orders were appealled to the CA7 together. See CA7 decision in petn 
no. 78-1545, at A2 & A8. Because the CA7 stayed the mandate in its 
decision reviewing these orders, see petn in no. 80-951 at 2a, the 
Oct. 15, 1976, order finding that timely charges had been filed also 
remains "final and intact." 
It is, therefore EOS~ble to affirm the decisions below, 
--
yet remain consistent with Evans. Under this approach, the DC's 
seniority-award order would be affirmed because it is based on 
"final and intact" findings of discrimination and of timely charges. 
On the other hand, this approach may be entirely too technical, and 
it might be better to dissent, noting that you would remand. Such a 
dissent could note that there is a "final and intact" finding of 
timeliness and could even suggest that it is not clear what the 
majority would have done had that not been true. 
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? 
;(I am not entirely content with this formalistic resolution of 
the "timely filing" issue. But, after 12 years of litigation, 
neither the parties nor the lower courts have even focused on 
whether the failure to file timely charges should affect the balance 
of ~ equities in awarding competitive-status seniority. Perhaps 
the equities of all of the parties--as well as the for~ecord set 
forth above--justify the Court's judgment approving the settlement. 
.To: The Chlef' Justice 
J ust ice Brennan 
Just icn Whtt 






From · JL.. , 1e .tlo well 
Circul,tr .. \ 5 1&8! 
1st DRAFT Rec..l ll ua: 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 78-1545 AND 80-951 
ANNE B. ZIPES, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
78-1545 v. 
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT 
ATTENDANTS, PETITIONER 
80-951 v. 
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1982] 
JusTICE POWELL concurring in No. 78-1545 and concur-
ring in the judgment in No. 80-951. 
The above cases arise out of the same protracted contro-
versy, and the Court disposes of them in a single opinion. 
The only question in No. 78-1545 is whether the timely filing 
of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing 
a Title VII suit. I agree that timely filing is not jurisdic-
tional and is subject to waiver and estoppel. Accordingly, I 
join parts I and II of the Court's opinion. 
I join only the judgment in No. 80-951. My concern with 
the Court's opinion is that it does not make clear that a timely 
charge, as well as a violation of Title VII, is a prerequisite to 
disturbing rights under a bona fide seniority system pro-
tected by § 703(h), 42 U. S. C. § 2000 e-2(h). 1 This was 
'In Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976), timely charges of discrimi-
78-1545 & 80-951-CONCUR 
2 ZIPES v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
made clear in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 
559 (1977), a case not discussed in the Court's opinion. 2 I 
nevertheless concur in the remand of No. 8~951, in which a 
settlement agreement was approved awarding retroactive 
competitive-status seniority under the standard of Franks v. 
Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976). This case has been in litiga-
tion since 1970, and in view of its comple~t)/it is difficult to 
be certain as to "what happened and whei_V I believe, how-
ever, that one can conclude that the requirements of Evans 
were met. 
~ne noted in the Court's opinion, ante at --, the Dis-
trict Court's order finding class-wide discrimination is now fi-
nal and intact. The District Court also entered an order 
finding that timely charges had been filed for all class mem-
bers, and that order is similarly final and intact. The timely-
charge order was entered on October 15, 1976, three days be-
fore the entry of the order finding class-wide discrimination. 
These orders were consolidated on appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit. Although the October 18th 
order, finding discrimination, was affirmed, the Court of Ap-
peals vacated the other order, holding that the members of 
Subclass B had failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements 
nation had been filed. Relief was awarded on the theory that current em-
ployees were merely being placed in the position they would have enjoyed, 
relative to the victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. In con-
trast, when the victims of discrimination have slept on their rights, it will 
often be unfair to award them full retroactive seniority at the expense of 
employees who may have accrued their present seniority in good faith. 
When timely charges have not been filed, a District Court should consider 
these equities in determining whether to award competitive-status senior-
ity, and the presence of a settlement between the employer and the plain-
tiffs should not affect the balancing of these equities. Under any other 
rule, employers will be able to settle Title VII actions, in part, by bargain-
ing away the rights of current employees. 
2 The Court cites United Air Lines v. Evans twice, see notes 6 and 12 
ante at - and -; both references are to terms used by the Evans 
Court in describing the timely-filing requirement. 
7~1545 & 8{}.-951-CONCUR 
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of Title VII because they had not filed timely claims. No 
district court order was ever actually vacated because, on the 
motion of the parties, the Court of Appeals stayed its man-
date, and the parties then reached a settlement. Today, the 
Court reverses that portion of the Court of Appeals' judg-
ment that would have vacated the October 15th order. As a 
result, both the October 15th and October 18th orders, find-
ing timely charges and class-wide discrimination, are now 
final and intact. I therefore concur in the judgment of the 
Court affirming the award of retroactive competitive-status 
seniority under the standard of Franks v. Bowman. 3 
3 I am not entirely content with this formalistic resolution of the "timely 
filing'' issue. But, after almost 12 years of litigation, neither the parties 
nor the lower courts have even focused on whether the failure to file timely 
charges should affect the balance of the equities in awarding competitive-
status seniority. Perhaps the equities of all of the parties-as well as the 




No. 78-1545, ZIPS v. TWA & 
No. 80-951, INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDENTS 
v. TWA 
Justice Powell concurring in No. 78-1545 and 
concurring in the judgment in No. 80-951. 
The above cases arise out of the same protracted 
controversy, and the Court disposes of them in a single 
opinion. The only question in No. 78-1545 is whether the 
timely filing of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional 
h 
prerequisite V bringing a Title VII suit. I agree that 
~;f.L&~1 
Hi~ is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver and 
estoppel. Accordingly, I join parts I and II of the 
Court's opinion. 
I join only the judgment in No. 80-951. My ,concern 
with the Court's opinion is that it does not make clear 
that a timely charge, as well as a violation of Title VII, 
is a prerequisite to disturbing rights under a bona fide 
2. 
seniority system protected by Section 703(h), 42 u.s.c. 
§2000 e-2(h) •1 This was made clear in United Airlines, 
Inc. v. Evans, 431 u.s. 553, 559 (1977), a case not 
discussed in the Court's opinion. 2 I nevertheless concur 
in the remand of No. 80-951, in which a settlement 
agreement was approved awarding retroactive competitive-
status seniority under the standard of Franks v. Bowman, 
424 u.s. 747 (1976). This case has been in litigation 
since 1970, and in view of its complexity it is difficult 
to be certain as to "what happened and when". I believe, 
however, that one can conclude that the requirements of 
Evans were met. 
lA<,~~~ 
1In Franks v. 424 u.s. 747 (1976), timely 
charges o had been filed. Relief was 
awarded on the theory th current employees were merely 
being placed in the pos · tion they would have enjoyed, 
relative to the victims, ad no discrimination ever taken 
place. In contrast, whe the victims of discrimination 
have slept on their rig ts, it will often be unfair to 
award them full retroac i ve seniority at the expense of 
inneeent employees who may have accrued their present 
seniority. lJ.y ~r-ferming lolAoQQSil'a:ble jo&s. When timely 
charges have not been filed, a District Court should 
consider these equities in determining whether to award 
competitive-status seniority, and the presence of a 
settlement between the employer and the plaintiffs should 
not affect the balancing of these equities. Under any 
other rule, employers will be able to settle Title VII 
actions, in part, by bargaining away the rights of current 
employees. 
2The Court cites United Air Lines v. Evans twice, 
see notes 6 and 12 ante at and ; both references 
are to terms used by the Evans Cou~in describing the 
timely-filing requirement. 
3. 
As the noted in the Court's opinion, ante at ___ , the 
District Court's order finding class-wide discrimination 
I 
I 
is now final and intact. The District Court also entered 
an order finding that timely charges had been filed for 
all class members, and that order is similarly final and 
intact. The timely-charge order was entered on October 
15, 1976, three days before the entry of the order finding 
class-wide discrimination. These orders were consolidated 
on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
Although the October 18th order, finding discrimination, 
was affirmed, the Court of Appeals vacated the other 
order, holding that the members of Subclass B had failed 
to meet the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII 
because they had not filed timely claims. No district 
court order was ever actually vacated because, on the 
motion of the parties, the Court of Appeals stayed its 
mandate, and the parties then reached a settlement. 
Today, the Court reverses that portion of the Court of 
J.1,w..,(-~ ~ 
Appeals' judgment whieh...{ vacated the October 15th order. 
As a result, both the October 15th and October 18th 
orders, finding timely charges and class-wide 
4. 
discrimination, are now final and intact. I therefore 
concur in the judgment of the Court affirming the award of 
retroactive competitive-status seniority under the 
standard of Franks v. Bowman. 
'3_} 
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To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
Justice White 
Jusu ce Marshall 
( 0-' ..1 ~I 
Just~cJ Blackmun 
Just ~ Rebnquist 
Jur:;,t iC'H Stevens 
qrv P-~ Ju&tice O'Connbr 
'2 ¢ v ;:Jc- Fr om · Justice Powell 
Circulated : JAH 1 5 1982 
1st DRAFT 
Ber rcuJated: 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 78-1545 AND 80-951 
ANNE B. ZIPES, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
78--1545 v. 
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT 
ATTENDANTS, PETITIONER 
80-951 v. 
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL concurring in No. 78--1545 and concur-
ring in the judgment in No. 80-951. 
The above cases arise out of the same protracted contro-
versy, and the Court disposes of them in a single opinion. 
The only question in No. 78--1545 is whether the timely filing 
of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing 
a Title VII suit. I agree that timely filing is not jurisdic-
tional and is subject to waiver and estoppel. Accordingly, I 
join parts I and II of the Court's opinion. 
I join only the judgment in No. 80-951. My concern with 
the Court's opinion is that it does not make clear that a timely 
charge, as well as a violation of Title VII, is a prerequisite to 
disturbing rights under a bona fide seniority system pro-
tected by § 703(h), 42 U. S. C. § 2000 e-2(h). 1 This was 
'In Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976), timely charges of discrimi-
------
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made clear in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 
559 (1977), a case not discussed in the Court's opinion. 2 I 
nevertheless concur in the remand of No. 80-951, in which a 
settlement agreement was approved awarding retroactive 
competitive-status seniority under the standard of Franks v. 
Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976). This case has been in litiga-
tion since 1970, and in view of its comple \fJ it is difficult to 
be certain as to "what happened and whe I believe, how-
ever, that one can conclude that the requirements of Evans 
were met. 
As the noted in the Court's opinion, ante at--, the Dis-
trict Court's order finding class-wide discrimination is now fi-
nal tPHd-int.act. The District Court also entered an order 
finding that timely charges had been filed for all class mem-
bers, and that order is similarly final and intact. The timely-
charge order was entered on October 15, 1976, three days be-
fore the entry of the order finding class-wide discrimination. 
These orders were consolidated on appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit. Although the October 18th 
order, finding discrimination, was affirmed, the Court of Ap-
peals vacated the other order, holding that the members of 
Subclass B had failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements 
nation had been filed. Relief was awarded on the theory that current em-
ployees were merely being placed in the position they would have enjoyed, 
relative to the victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. In con-
trast, when the victims of discrimination have slept on their rights, it will 
often be unfair to award them full retroactive seniority at the expense of 
employees who may have accrued their present seniority in good faith. 
When timely charges have not been filed, a District Court should consider 
these equities in determining whether to award competitive-status senior-
ity, and the presence of a settlement between the employer and the plain-
tiffs should not affect the balancing of these equities. Under any other 
rule, employers will be able to settle Title VII actions, in part, by bargain-
ing away the rights of current employees. 
2 The Court cites United Air Lines v. Evans twice, see notes 6 and 12 
ante at -- and --; both references are to terms used by the Evans 
Court in describing the timely-filing requirement. 
-- ---
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of Title VII because they had not filed timely claims. No 
district court order was ever actually vacated because, on the 
motion of the parties, the Court of Appeals stayed its man-
date, and the parties then reached a settlement. Today, the 
Court reverses that portion of the Court of Appeals' judg-
ment that would have vacated the October 15th order. As a 
result, both the October 15th and October 18th orders, find-
ing timely charges and class-wide discrimination, are now 
final~ I therefore concur in the judgment of the 
Court affirming the award of retroactive competitive-status 
seniority under tbP' J~.J<:.>n~~-z;;-, ·s v. Bowman. 3 
};o_~~ 
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3 I am not entirely conte with this formalistic resolution of the "timely 
filing'' issue. But, after most 12 years of litigation, neither the parties 
nor tfie ~ courts have -eR whether the failure to file timely 
charges should affect the alance of the equities in awarding competitive-
status seniority. !Perhaps the equities of all of the parties-as well as the 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 78-1545 AND 80-951 
ANNE B. ZIPES, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
78-1545 v. 
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT 
ATTENDANTS, PETITIONER 
80-951 v. 
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[January -, 1982] . . 
JUSTICE POWELL, With whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JusTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in No. 78-1545 and con-
curring in the judgment in No. 80-951. 
The above cases arise out of the same protracted contro-
versy, and the Court disposes of them in a single opinion. 
The only question in No. 78-1545 is whether the timely filing 
of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing 
a Title VII suit. I agree that timely filing is not jurisdic-
tional and is subject to waiver and estoppel. Accordingly, I 
join parts I and II of the Court's opinion. 
I join only the judgment in No. 80-951. My concern with 
the Court's opinion is that it does not make clear that a timely 
charge, as well as a violation of Title VII, is a prerequisite to 
disturbing rights under a bona fide seniority system pro-
tected by§ 703(h), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h).' This was made 
1 In Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976), timely charges of discrimi-
7S-1545 & 80-951-CONCUR 
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clear in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 559 
(1977), a case not discussed in the Court's opinion. 2 I never-
theless concur in the remand of No. 80-951, in which a settle-
ment agreement was approved awarding retroactive compet-
itive-status seniority under the standard of Franks v. Bow-
man, 424 U. S. 747 (1976). This case has been in litigation 
since 1970, and in view of its complexity it is difficult to be 
certain as to "what happened and when." I believe, how-
ever, that one can conclude that the requirements of Evans 
were met. 
As noted in the Court's opinion, ante, at--, the District 
Court's order finding class-wide discrimination is now final. 
The District Court also entered an order finding that timely 
charges had been filed for all class members, and that order is 
similarly final. The timely-charge order was entered on 
October 15, 1976, three days before the entry of the order 
finding class-wide discrimination. These orders were con-
solidated on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. Although the October 18th order, finding discrimi-
nation, was affirmed, the Court of Appeals vacated the other 
order, holding that the members of Subclass B had failed to 
meet the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII because 
nation had been filed. Relief was awarded on the theory that current em-
ployees were merely being placed in the position they would have enjoyed, 
relative to the victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. In con-
trast, when the victims of discrimination have slept on their rights, it will 
often be unfair to award them full retroactive seniority at the expense of 
employees who may have accrued their present seniority in good faith. 
When timely charges have not been filed, a District Court should consider 
these equities in determining whether to award competitive-status senior-
ity, and the presence of a settlement between the employer and the plain-
tiffs should not affect the balancing of these equities. Under any other 
rule, employers will be able to settle Title VII actions, in part, by bargain-
ing away the rights of current employees. 
2 The Court cites United Air Lines v. Evans twice, see notes 6 and 12 
ante, at -- and --; both references are to terms used by the Evans 
Court in describing the timely-filing requirement. 
-
... 
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they had not filed timely claims. No district court order was 
ever actually vacated because, on the motion of the parties, 
the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate, and the parties 
then reached a settlement. Today, the Court reverses that 
portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment that would have 
vacated the October 15th order. As a result, both the Octo-
ber 15th and October 18th orders, finding timely charges and 
class-wide discrimination, are now final. I therefore concur 
in the judgment of the Court affirming the award of retroac-
tive competitive-status seniority under the standard of 
Franks v. Bowman.3 
3 I am not entirely content with this formalistic resolution of the "timely 
filing" issue. But, after almost 12 years of litigation, neither the parties 
nor the courts have addressed specifically whether the failure to file timely 
charges should affect the balance of the equities in awarding competitive-
status seniority. Rather than prolong this disruptive litigation, it may 
well be in the best interest of all of the parties to approve the settlement-
as the Court's judgment does today . 
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Nos. 78-1545 and 80-951 
ANNE B. ZIPES, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
78-1545 v. 
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT 
ATTENDANTS, PETITIONER 
80--951 v. 
_ TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., ET AL. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1982] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The primary question in these cases is whether the statu-
tory time limit for filing charges under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 235, as amended, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e et seq., (1970 ed.) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a 
suit in the District Court. Secondarily, we resolve a dispute 
as to whether retroactive seniority was a proper remedy in 
this Title VII case. 
I 
In 1970, the Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Associa-
tion (ALSSA), then the collective bargaining agent of Trans 
World Airlines (TWA) flight attendants, brought a class ac-
tion alleging that TWA practiced unlawful sex discrimination 
in violation of Title VII by its policy of grounding all female 
flight cabin attendants who became mothers, while their male 
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counterparts who became fathers were permitted to continue 
flying. After collective bargaining eliminated the challenged 
practice prospectively, the parties in the case reached a ten-
tative settlement. The settlement, which provided neither 
backpay nor retroactive seniority, was approved by the Dis-
trict Court. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
however, found the union to be an inadequate representative 
of the class because of the inherent conflict between the in-
terests of current and former employees. It remanded the 
case with instructions that the District Court name individual 
members of the class to replace ALSSA as the class repre-
sentative. 1 Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Associa-
tion v. American Airlines Inc., 490 F. 2d 636 (CA7 1973). 
Upon remand, petitioners in No. 78-1545 were appointed 
as class representatives. TWA moved to amend its answer 
to assert that the .claims of plaintiffs and other class members 
were barred by Title VII's "statute of limitations" because 
they had failed to file charges with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the statutory time 
limit. 1 App. 89a. 2 Although the District Court granted 
the motion to amend, it noted that the "delay in pleading the 
defense of limitations may well ultimately constitute a waiver 
of the defense." 1 App. lOla. 
Subsequently, on October 15, 1976, the District Court de-
nied TWA's motion to exclude class members who had not 
' The class was defined as all female flight cabin attendants who were 
terminated from employment with TWA on or after July 2, 1965 for rea-
sons of pregnancy. The Court of Appeals assumed the class to include 
only those who would have resumed flight duty after becoming mothers 
but for TWA's policy. In reConsolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Air-
line Cases, 582 F . 2d 1142, 1147, & n. 9 (CA7 1978). The class thus in-
cluded both former employees & current employees, that is, both those 
who declined and those who accepted ground positions. 
2 When suit was filed, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970 ed.) required 
charges to be filed within 90 days of the alleged unlawful employment prac-
tice. In 1972, this provision was amended to extend the time limit to 180 
days and is now codified as § 2000e-5(e). 
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filed timely charges with the EEOC. In support of its mo-
tion, TWA argued that instead of an affirmative defense anal-
ogous to a statute of limitations, timely filing with the EEOC 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite not subject to waiver by any 
action of the defendants. While the District Court agreed 
that the filing requirements of Title VII are jurisdictional, it 
denied the motion on the basis that any violation by the air-
lines continued against all the class members until the airline 
changed the challenged policy. 1 App. 131a-32a. On Octo-
ber 18, 1974, the District Court granted the motion of the 
plaintiff class for summary judgment on the issue of TWA's 
liability for violating Title VII. 1 App. 133a-134a. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of October 18, 
1976, granting summary judgment on liability, expressly 
holding that "TWA's no motherhood policy ... provides a 
clear example of the discrimination prohibited by 
§ 2000e-2(a)." In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in 
the Airline Cases, 582 F. 2d 1142, 1145 (CA7 1978). It de-
clined, however, "to extend the continuing violation theory, 
as did the district court, so as to include in the plaintiff class 
those employees who were permanently terminated more 
than 90 days before the filing of EEOC charges." /d., at 
1149. 
The Court of Appeals went on to hold that timely filing of 
EEOC charges was a jurisdictional prerequisite. Because 
TWA could not waive the timely filing requirement, the 
Court of Appeals found that approximately 92% of the plain-
tiffs' claims were jursidictionally barred by the failure of 
those plaintifffs to have filed charges of discrimination with 
the EEOC within 90 days the alleged unlawful employment 
practice. The Court of Appeals, however, stayed its man-
date pending the filing of petitions in this Court. Petitions 
for certiorari were filed by the plaintiff class, No. 78-1545, 
and by TWA, No. 78-1549. This Court granted a motion to 
defer consideration of the petitions pending completion of set-
tlement proceedings in the District Court. 
In connection with the settlement proceedings, the District 
.. 
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Court designated two subclasses. Subclass A, consisting of 
some 30 women, comprised those who were terminated on or 
after March 2, 1970, as well as those who were discharged 
earlier, but who had accepted reinstatement in ground duty 
positions. Subclass B, numbering some 400 women, covered 
all other members of the class and consisted of those whose 
claims the Court of Appeals had found to be jurisdictionally 
barred for failure to satisfy the timely filing requirement. 2 
App. 3. 
The proposed settlement divided three million dollars be-
tween the two groups. It also provided each class member 
with full company and union seniority from the date of termi-
nation. The agreement specified that "in the event of the 
timely objection of any interested person, it is agreed that 
the amount of seniority and credit for length of service for the 
compensation period will be determined by the Court in its 
discretion, pursuant to the provisions of Section 706(g), 3 and 
all other applicable provisions of law, without contest or 
objection by TWA." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 80--951, p. 
29a. 
The Independent Federation of Flight Attendents (union), 
which had replaced ALSSA as the collective bargaining agent 
for the flight attendants, was permitted to intervene and to 
object to the settlement. On the basis that the Court of Ap-
peals had not issued the mandate in its jurisdictional decision, 
the District Court rejected the union's challenge to its juris-
diction over Subclass B. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 
3 Section 706(g) of Title VII , 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-5(g) (1976 ed) provides: 
"If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is 
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the 
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such un-
lawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be 
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hir-
ing of employees, with or without back pay ... , or any other equitable 
relief as the court deems appropriate .. . . " 
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8~951, pp. 14a-15a. After holding three days of hearing, 
the District Court approved the settlement and awarded 
competitive seniority. It explicitly found that full restora-
tion of retroactive seniority would not have an unusual ad-
verse impact upon currently employed flight attendants in 
any way atypical of Title VII cases. App. to Pet. for Cert. 
in No. 8~951, pp. 18a-19a. 
The union appealed. It argued that, because of the Court 
of Appeals' earlier opinion, the District Court lacked jurisdic-
tion to approve the settlement or order retroactive seniority 
with respect to Subclass B. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 
reasoning that "the principles favoring settlement of class ac-
tion law suits remain the same regardless of whether the dis-
puted legal issues center on the jurisdiction of the court over 
the action." Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v. 
Trans World Airlines, 630 F. 2d 1164, 1169 (CA7 1980). It 
further explained that the question of jurisdiction as to Sub-
class B had not been finally determined because a challenge 
to its decision was pending before this Court and that the 
Courts of Appeals were split on the issue. The Court of Ap-
peals noted that the district court clearly had subject matter 
jurisdiction over the claims of Subclass A. It concluded, 
"Where, as here, the jurisdictional question is not settled 
with finality, parties should not be forced to litigate the issue 
of jurisdiction if they can arrive at a settlement that is other-
wise appropriate for district court approval." Ibid. 
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the award of seniority. 
According to the court, the settlement served the public pol-
icy of remedying past acts of sex discrimination and the con-
sequences of those past act. Moreover, "[t]he right to have 
its objections heard does not, of course, give the intervenor 
the right to block any settlement to which it objects."· lbid. 4 
'The Court of Appeals relied on language in Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 779, n. 41 (1976): 
"[D]istrict courts should take as their starting point the presumption in 
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The union petitioned for certiorari, No. 80--951. We 
granted its petition together with the petition in No. 78--1545 
and No. 78--1549, -- U. S. --, but later removed the 
TWA case, No. 78-1549,S from the argument docket and lim-
ited the grant in No. 80--951. -- U. S. --. 
II 
The single question in No. 78--1545 is whether the timely 
filing of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
bringing a Title VII suit in federal court or whether the re-
quirement is subject to waiver and estoppel. In reaching its 
decision that the requirement is jurisdictional, the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on its reading of the 
statutory language, the absence of any indication to the con-
trary in the legislative history, and references in several of 
our cases to the 90-day filing requirement as "jurisdic-
tional." 6 Other Courts of Appeals that have examined the 
same materials have reached the opposite conclusion. 7 
favor of rightful-place seniority relief, and proceed with further legal anal-
ysis from that point; and that such relief may not be denied on the abstract 
basis of adverse impact upon interests of other employees but rather only 
on the basis of unusual adverse impact arising from facts and circumstances 
that would not be generally found in Title VII cases." 
5 In No. 78-1549, TWA contends (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in 
affirming summary judgment for plaintiffs on the issue of liability, (b) that 
TWA should be required to grant only prospective relief to plaintiffs, and 
(c) that the Court of Appeals erred in defining the subclass of plaintiffs who 
had filed timely charges with the EEOC. In view of our decision in No. 
78-1545 and No. 8{}-951, we now dismiss the petition in No. 78-1549 as im-
providently granted. 
• see Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, 429 U. S. 229, 240 (1976); 
United Air Lines, Inc . v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 555, n. 4 (1977); Alexander 
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36,47 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798 (1973). 
7 See Carlile v. South Routt School District Re 3-J, 652 F . 2d 981 (CAIO 
1981); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F. 2d 584 (CA5 
1981); Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F. 2d 255 (CA61979); Hart v. 
J .T. Baker Chemical Co., 598 F . 2d 829 (CA3 1979); Laffey v. Northwest 
Airlines, Inc. , 567 F. 2d 429 (CADC 1976). 
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We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with 
the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in fed-
eral court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limita-
tions, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. 8 
The structure of Title VII, the congressional policy underly-
ing it, and the reasoning of our cases all lead to this 
conclusion. 
The provision granting district courts jurisdiction under 
Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e) and (f) (1974), does not 
limit jurisdiction to those cases in which there has been a 
timely filing with the EEOC. 9 It contains no reference to 
the timely filing requirement. The provision specifying the 
time for filing charges with the EEOC appears as an entirely 
separate provision, and it does not speak in jurisdictional 
terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the the dis-
8 One of the questions on which we granted certiorari in No. 80-951 was 
whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's ap-
proval of the settlment of jurisdictionally barred claims. In reaching its 
decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explicitly declined to 
follow McArthur v. Sourthern Airway, 569 F. 2d 276 (CA5 1978) (en bane). 
Airlines Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. v. TWA, 630 F. 2d, at 
1168-1169. In McArthur, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed the approval of a settlement agreement in a Title VII class action, 
holding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because no plaintiff had 
filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Because of our 
holding in No. 78-1545 that timely filing with the EEOC is not a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite, this issue need not be resolved. 
9 42 U. S. C. § 2000e--5(f)(3), for example, reads: 
"Each United States district court and each United States court of a place 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of 
actions brought under this subchapter. Such an action may be brought in 
any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice 
· is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the em-
ployment records relevant to such practice are maintained and adminis-
tered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have 
worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the re-
spondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be 
brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his princi-
pal office .. . . " 
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trict courts. 10 The legislative history of the filing provision is 
sparse, but Senator Humphrey did characterize the time pe-
riod for filing a claim as a "period of limitations," 110 Cong. 
Rec. 12723, and Senator Case described its purpose as pre-
venting the pressing of "stale" claims, 110 Cong. Rec. 7243, 
the end served by a statute of limitations. 
Although subsequent legislative history is not dispostive, 
see Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U. S. 
572, 596 (1980); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 
677, 686 n. 7 (1979), the legislative history of the 1972 amend-
ments also indicates that Congress intended the filing period 
to operate as a statute of limitations instead of a jurisdictional 
requirement. In the Final Conference Committee section-
by-section analysis of H. R. 1745, The Equal Opportunity Act 
of 1972, 118 Cong. Rec. 7166, 7167, the Committee not only 
termed the filing period a "time limitation," but explained: 
"This subsection as amended provides that charges be 
filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment 
practice. Court decisions under the present law have 
shown an inclination to interpret this time limitation so 
as to give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of 
the law; it is not intended that such court decisions 
should be in any way circumscribed by the extension of 
the time limitations in this subsection." 11 
10 Section 2000e-5(e) (1976), the amended version of the filing provision, 
reads simply: "A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred 
and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice 
occurred .... " 
" The Senate Labor Comittee's Section by Section analysis of the 
Amendments explained that "[t]his subsection would permit ... a limita-
tion period similar to that contained in the Labor-Management Relations 
Act, as amended." S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1971). 
We have recognized that the National .Labor Refations Act was "the model 
for Title VII's remedial provisons," Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 
324, 366 (1977). Because the time requirement for filing an unfair labor 
practice charge under the National Labor Relations Act operates as a stat-
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This result is entirely consistent with prior case law. Al-
though our cases contain scattered references to the timely 
filing requirement as jurisdictional, the legal character of the 
requirement was not at issue in those case, and as or more 
often in the same or other cases, we have referred to the pro-
vision as a limitations statute. '2 
ute of limitations subject to recognized equitable doctrines and not a re-
striction of the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, see 
NLRB v. Local 264, Laborers' Int'l Union, 529 F. 2d 778, 781-785 (CA8 
1976); Shumate v. NLRB, 452 F. 2d 717, 720 (CA4 1971); NLRB v. A. E. 
Nettleton Co., 241 F. 2d 130, 133 (CA2 1957); NLRB v. Itasca Cotton Mfg . 
Co., 179 F . 2d 504, 50tH507 (CA5 1950), the time limitations under Title 
VII should be treated likewise. 
Moreover, when Congress in 1978 revised the filing requirement of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Stat. 607, 29 U. S. C. 
§§ 621 et seq., which was modeled after Title VII, see Oscar Mayer & Co. 
v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750 (1979), the House Conference report explicitly 
stated that "the 'charge' requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
maintaining an action under the ADEA and that therefore equitable modi-
fication for failing to file within the time period will be available to plaintiffs 
under this Act." House Conference Report No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 
at 12, reprinted in 1978 U. S. Code Cong & Admin. News 504, 534 (foot-
note omitted). 
12 As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit points out in its opinion in 
Coke, 640 F . 2d, at 588-589, references to the filing requirement as a stat-
ute of limitations have come to dominate in our opinions: 
"The trend of the Supreme Court cases is also significant. In the early 
cases, the Court in dicta referred to such time provisions using the label 
jurisdictional prerequisite. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 
792 .. . (1973); Alexander v. Gardner· Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 . .. (1974). 
In the 1976 Robbins & Myers decision the jurisdictional label was used 
once, but there were numerous references to 'tolling the limitations pe-
riod,' 429 U. S. at 239, ... and other labels obviously referring to a statute 
of limitations, as opposed to subject matter jurisdiction. See also United 
Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, . .. (1977), in which both labels are 
used. From and after late 1977, all nine justices have concurred in opin-
ions containing dicta using the limitations label to the exclusion of the juris-
dictional label. Occidental Life Insurance Company v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 
355, 371-372, . . . (1977); United Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 
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More weighty inferences are to be drawn from other cases, 
however. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 
U. S. 747 (1976), was a Title VII suit against an employer 
and a union. The District Court denied relief for unnamed 
class members on the ground that those individuals had not 
filed administrative charges under the provisions of Title VII 
and that relief for them was thus not appropriate. The 
Court of Appeals did not disturb this ruling, but we reversed, 
saying, 
"The District Court stated two reasons for its denial of 
seniority relief for the unnamed class members. The 
first was that those individuals had not filed adminis-
trative charges under the provision of Title VII with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and there-
fore class relief of this sort was not appropriate. Were-
jected this justification for denial of class-based relief in 
the context of backpay awards in Albemarle Paper, [ 422 
U. S. 405 (1975)] and ... reject it here. This justifica-
tion for denying class-based relief in Title VII suits has 
been unanimously rejected by the courts of appeals, and 
Congress ratified that construction by the 1972 amend-
ments. . .. " 424 U. S., at 771 [footnote omitted]. 
If the timely filing requirement were to limit the jurisdic-
tion of the district court to those claimants who have filed 
timely charges with the EEOC, the district courts in Franks 
and Albemarle would have been without jurisdiction to ad-
judicate the claims of those who had not filed as well as with-
out jurisdiction to award them seniority. We did not so 
hold. Furthermore, we noted that Congress had approved 
the Court of Appeals cases that awarded relief to class mem-
bers who had not exhausted administrative remedies before 
385, 391-391 . . . (1980); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 
818-823 .... (1980), Delaware State College v. Ricks,- U. S. -, ... 
(1980)." 
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the EEOC. It is evident that in doing so, Congress neces-
sarily adopted the view that the provision for filing charges 
with the EEOC should not be construed to erect a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to suit in the District Court. 
In Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522 (1972), we an-
nounced a guiding principle for construing the provisions of 
Title VII. Declining to read literally another filing provision 
of Title VII, we explained that a technical reading would be 
"particularly inappropriate in a statuory scheme in which lay-
men, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process." 
404 U. S., at 527. That principle must be applied here as 
well. 
The reasoning of other cases assumes that the filing re-
quirement is not jurisdictional. In Electrical Workers v. 
Robbins & Myers, 429 U. S. 229 (1976), we rejected the argu-
ment that the timely filing requirement should be tolled be-
cause the plaintiff had been pursuing a grievance procedure 
set up in the collective bargaining agreement. We did not 
reach this decision on on the basis that the 180 day period 
was jurisdictional. Instead, we considered the merits of a 
series of arguments that grievance procedures should toll the 
requirement. Such reasoning would have been gratuitous if 
the filing requirement were a jurisdictional prerequisite. 13 
Similarly, we did not sua sponte dismiss the action in 
13 In Robbins & Myers, we also held that the expanded 180 "limitations 
period," enacted by the 1972 amendments, was retroactive. 429 U.S. at 
244. This holding presupposes that the requirement is not jurisdictional. 
Moreover, in reaching this conclusion, we quoted from Chase Securities 
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 31fr-316 (1945): "[C]ertainly it cannot 
be said that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a rem-
edy lost through mere lapse of time is per se an offense against the Four-
teenth Amendment." Several circuit courts have read Robbins & Myers 
as implicitly approving equitable tolling. Coke v. General Board of Ad-
justment, 640 F . 2d 584, 588 (CA5 1981); Hart v. J. T. Baker Chemical 
Co., 598 F. 2d 829, 833 (CA3 1979); Smith v. American President Lines, 
Ltd., 571 F. 2d 102, 10S-109 (CA2 1978). 
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Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807 (1980) on the basis 
that the district court lacked jurisdiction because of plaintiff's 
failure to comply with a related Title VII time provision. In-
stead, we merely observed in a footnote that "[p]etitioner did 
not assert respondent's failure to file the action within 90 
days as a defense." 447 U. S., at 811, n. 9. 
By holding compliance with the filing period to be not a ju-
risdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a re-
quirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so 
requires, we honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as 
a whole without negating the particular purpose of the filing 
requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer. 
We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals in No. 78--1545. 
III 
In No. 80--951, the union challenges on several grounds the 
District Court's authority to award, over the union's 
objection, retroactive seniority to the members of Subclass 
B. We have already rejected the union's first contention, 
namely, the District Court had no jurisdiction to award relief 
to those who had not complied with Title VII's filing require-
ment. The union also contends that in any event there has 
been no finding of discrimination with respect to Class B 
members and that the predicate for relief under § 706(g) is 
therefore missing. This contention is also without merit. 
The District Court unquestionably found an unlawful dis-
crimination against the plaintiff class, and the class at that 
time had not been subdivided into Subclasses A and B. 
Summary judgment ran in favor of the entire class, including 
both those members who had filed timely charges and those 
who had not. The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary 
judgment order as well as the finding of a discriminatory em-
ployment practice. The court went on, however, to hold 
that the District Court had no jurisdiction over claims by 
those who had not met the filing requirement and that those 
individuals should have been excluded from the class prior to 
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the grant of summary judgment. But as we have now held, 
that ruling is erroneous. The District Court did have juris-
diction over non-filing class members. Thus, there was no 
jurisdictional barrier to its finding of discrimi1;1ation with re-
spect to the entire class. With the reversal of the Court of 
Appeals judgment in No. 7&-1545 and our dismissal of No. 
7&-1549, which had challenged the affirmance of the sum-
mary judgment order, the order that found class-wide 
discrimination remains intact and is final. The award of ret-
roactive seniority to members of Subclass B as well as Sub-
class A is not infirm for want of a finding of a discriminatory 
employment practice. 
Equally meritless is the union's contention that retroactive 
seniority contrary to the collective bargaining agreement 
should not be awarded over the objection of a union that has 
not itself been found guilty of discrimination. In Franks v. 
Bowman, 424 U. S. 747, 764 (1976) we read the legislative 
history of Title VII as giving 
"emphatic confirmation that federal courts are empow-
ered to fashion such relief as the particular circum-
stances of a case may require to effect restitution, mak-
ing whole in so far as possible the victims of ... 
discrimination .... " 
While recognizing that back pay was the only remedy specifi-
cally mentioned in the provision, we reasoned that adequate 
relief might be denied without a seniority remedy. We con-
cluded that the class-based seniority relief for identifiable vic-
tims of illegal discrimination is a form of relief generally ap-
propriate under § 706(g). 
In Franks, the District Court had found both that the em-
ployer had engaged in discrimination and that the discrimina-
tory practices were perpetuated in the collective bargaining 
agreements with the unions. 424 U. S., at 751. Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977), however, makes it 
clear that once there has been a finding of discrimination by 
78-1545 & 80-951-0PINION 
14 ZIPES v. TWA 
the employer, an award of retroactive seniority is appropri-
ate even if there is no finding that the union has also illegally 
discriminated. In Teamsters, the parties agreed to a decree 
which provided that the District Court would decide 
"whether any discriminatees should be awarded additional 
equitable relief such as retroactive seniority." 431 U. S., at 
331, n. 4. Although we held that the union had not violated 
Title VII by agreeing to and maintaining the seniority sys-
tem, we nonetheless directed the union to remain in the liti-
gation as a defendant so that full relief could be awarded the 
victims of the employers post-act discrimination. 431 U. S., 
at 356, n. 43. 14 Here, as in Teamsters, the settlement left to 
the District Court the final decision as to retroactive 
seniority. 
In resolving the seniority issue, the District Court gave 
the union all the process that was due it under Title VII in 
our cases. The union was allowed to intervene. The Dis-
trict Court heard its objections, made appropriate findings, 
and determined that retroactive seniority should be awarded. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with that determination, and 
we have eliminated from our consideration here the question 
whether on the facts of this case the Court of Appeals and the 
District Court were in error in this respect. 
Accordingly, the judgment in 78-1545 is reversed and the 
judgment in 80-951 is affirmed. 
So ordered. 
JUSTICE STEVENS did not participate in consideration or 
decision of these cases. 
14 In noting that the union in Teamsters properly remained a defendant in 
the litigation, we cited to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19(a). The union in this 
case was not joined under Rule 19 when individuals replaced the union as 
class representatives, but intervened later. Cf. EEOC v. MacMillan 
Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA6 1974) (joinder under 
Rule 19(a) provides union with full opportunity to participate in the litiga-
tion and the formulation of proposed relief, although as practical matter 
union not play role in litigation until court finds violation of Title VII). 
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a Title VII suit. I agree that timely filing is not jurisdic-
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man, 424 U. S. 747 (1976). This case has been in litigation 
since 1970, and in view of its complexity it is difficult to be 
certain as to "what happened and when." I believe, how-
ever, that one can conclude that the requirements of Evans 
were met. 
As noted in the Court's opinion, ante, at --, the District 
Court's order finding class-wide discrimination is now final. 
The District Court also entered an order finding that timely 
charges had been filed for all class members, and that order is 
similarly final. The timely-charge order was entered on \ 
October 15, 1976, three days before the entry of the order 
finding class-wide discrimination. These orders were con-
solidated on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. Although the October 18th order, finding discrimi-
nation, was affirmed, the Court of Appeals vacated the other 
order, holding that the members of Subclass B had failed to 
meet the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII because 
nation had been filed. Relief was awarded on the theory that current em-
ployees were merely being placed in the position they would have enjoyed, 
relative to the victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. In con-
trast, when the victims of discrimination have slept on their rights, it will 
often be unfair to award them full retroactive seniority at the expense of 
employees who may have accrued their present seniority in good faith. 
When timely charges have not been filed, a District Court should consider 
these equities in determining whether to award competitive-status senior-
ity, and the presence of a settlement between the employer and the plain-
tiffs should not affect the balancing of these equities. Under any other 
rule, employers will be able to settle Title VII actions, in part, by bargain-
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2 The Court cites United Air Lines v. Evans twice, see notes 6 and 12 
ante, at -- and --; both references are to terms used by the Evans 
Court in describing the timely-filing requirement. 
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they had not filed timely claims. No district court order was 
ever actually vacated because, on the motion of the parties, 
the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate, and the parties 
then reached a settlement. Today, the Court reverses that 
portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment that would have 
vacated the October 15th order. As a result, both the Octo-
ber 15th and October 18th orders, finding timely charges and 
class-wide discrimination, are now final. I therefore concur \ 
in the judgment of the Court affirming the award of retroac-
tive competitive-status seniority under the standard of 
Franks v. Bowman. 3 
3 I am not entirely content with this formalistic resolution of the "timely 
filing" issue. But, after almost 12 years of litigation, neither the parties 
nor the courts have addressed specifically whether the failure to file timely 
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February 19, 1982 
Court l?oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 




Motion to file supplemental brief after argument 
HOLD 
FOR 
Burger, Ch. J ............... . . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J ..................... . 





N POST DI S AFF 
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... . 
Powell, J ..................... ....... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
·.·.·.·.·.·.~~-~·. 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Stevens, J ........................... . 
O'Connor, J .......................... . 
MERITS MOTION 
REV AFF G D 
No. 
78-1545 
ABSENT NOT \'OTING 
- - Qf} I 
... 
Toz !he Chief ~:st1ce 
Just icc Brennan 
Justi cE' V.'>ite 
Just i<'E 11 'Shall 
Justice I' Jk.'ll n 
Just1c ! ' ll'JU1Bt 
JusticP Stevens 
Justice O'Connor 
From: Justlce Powoll 
3rd DRAFT 
Circulated: _____ ----
JAIC 1 9 1982 
Recirculated:_- ~ · -
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 78-1545 AND 80-951 
ANNE B. ZIPES, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
78-1545 v. 
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT 
ATTENDANTS, PETITIONER 
80-951 v. 
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ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, 
concurring in No. 78-1545 and concurring in the judgment in 
No. 80-951. 
The above cases arise out of the same protracted contro-
versy, and the Court disposes of them in a single opinion. 
The only question in No. 78-1545 is whether the timely filing 
of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing 
a Title VII suit. I agree that timely filing is not jurisdic-
tional and is subject to waiver and estoppel. Accordingly, I 
join parts I and II of the Court's opinion. 
I join only the judgment in No. 80-951. My concern with 
the Court's opinion is that it does not make clear that a timely 
charge, as well as a violation of Title VII, is a prerequisite to 
disturbing rights under a bona fide seniority system pro-
tected by§ 703(h), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h). 1 This was made 
'In Franks v. Bowman, 424 U. S. 747 (1976), timely charges of discrimi-
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2 ZIPES v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. 
clear in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 559 
(1977), a case not discussed in the Court's opinion. 2 I never-
theless concur in the remand of No. 80-951, in which a settle-
ment agreement was approved awarding retroactive compet-
itive-status seniority under the standard of Franks v. Bow-
man, 424 U. S. 747 (1976). This case has been in litigation 
since 1970, and in view of its complexity it is difficult to be 
certain as to "what happened and when." I believe, how-
ever, that one can conclude that the requirements of Evans 
were met. 
As noted in the Court's opinion, ante, at--, the District 
Court's order finding class-wide discrimination is now final. 
The District Court also entered an order finding that timely 
charges had been filed for all class members, and that order is 
similarly final. The timely-charge order was entered on 
October 15, 1976, three days before the entry of the order 
finding class-wide discrimination. These orders were con-
solidated on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. Although the October 18th order, finding discrimi-
nation, was affirmed, the Court of Appeals vacated the other 
order, holding that the members of Subclass B had failed to 
meet the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII because 
nation had been filed. Relief was awarded on the theory that current em-
ployees were merely being placed in the position they would have enjoyed, 
relative to the victims, had no discrimination ever taken place. In con-
trast, when the victims of discrimination have slept on their rights, it will 
often be unfair to award them full retroactive seniority at the expense of 
employees who may have accrued their present seniority in good faith. 
When timely charges have not been filed, a District Court should consider 
these equities in determining whether to award competitive-status senior-
ity, and the presence of a settlement between the employer and the plain-
tiffs should not affect the balancing of these equities. Under any other 
rule, employers will be able to settle Title VII actions, in part, by bargain-
ing away the rights of current employees. 
2 The Court cites United Air Lines v. Evans twice, see notes 6 and 12 
ante, at -- and --; both references are to terms used by the Evans 
Court in describing the timely-filing requirement. 
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they had not filed timely claims. No district court order was 
ever actually vacated because, on the motion of the parties, 
the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate, and the parties 
then reached a settlement. Today, the Court reverses that 
portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment that would have 
vacated the October 15th order. As a result, both the Octo-
ber 15th and October 18th orders, finding timely charges and 
class-wide discrimination, are now final. I therefore concur 
in the judgment of the Court affirming the award of retroac-
tive competitive-status seniority under the standard of 
Franks v. Bowman.3 
3 I am not entirely content with this formalistic resolution of the "timely 
filing'' issue. But, after almost 12 years of litigation, neither the parties 
nor the courts have addressed specifically whether the failure to file timely 
charges should affect the balance of the equities in awarding competitive-
status seniority. Rather than prolong this disruptive litigation, it may 
well be in the best interest of all of the parties to approve the settlement-




February 19, . 1982 Conference 




TRANS WORLD AIRLINES 
No. 80-951 
IND. FED. OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS 
v. 
TR&~S WORLD AIRLINES 
I 
Motion of Respondent for 
Leave to File Supplemental 
Brief after Argument 
(Sane) 
SUMMARY: Arguments were heard on these consolidated cases on 
December 2, 1981. On January 25 the Court granted petr's motion 
for leave to file a suppleme ntal brief (Stevens, J., not participat-
ing). In that brief, the Court was urged to consider a recent CA 5 
. ________., 
decision, United States v. Miami, No. 77-1856 which, according to 
petr, impacts on the issue of entering a consent degree over objection 
- 2 -
of a union whose contract rights are adversely affected. Resp 
now also moves for ieave to file a supplemental brief in which it 
addresses the Miami case and the recent settlement of United States 
v. AT&T. 
DISCUSSION: 
should be granted. 
. ·--· 
The motion is in compliance with Rule 35.5 and 
I 
There is no response. 
2/2/82 
PJC 
Schlueter Miami Op~ in Petr's 
Supp. Brief 
CHAMBERS Or 
.§u:prttttt <!Jourl of tl(t~tt~ .§trut.9' 
~~~. I'J. QJ. 20§Jl.~ 
February 22, 1982 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Cases Held for No. 78-1545 and No. 80-951 -
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines 
No. 81-373: Bridgeport Firefighters v. Association Against 
Discrimination 
No. 81-374: City of Bridgeport v. Association Against 
Discrimination 
Both these cases involve a Title VII suit for discrimination 
against minority applicants for firefighter jobs through the use 
of a written examination. CA2 upheld the District Court's 
remedial order against an attack, inter alia, that the city could 
not be held liable for discriminatory hiring based on the 1971 
exam because the last such hirings occurred . on May 2, 1973, and 
resps filed their first EEOC charges later than the 300 days 
permitted under §706 (e), the timely filing provision applicable 
to complaints instituted before a state agency. The court 
explained that the 1971 exam and any hirings based on that exam 
were not isolated acts of discrimination, but part of a 
continuous policy of discrimination. The district court not only 
found a "clear-cut pattern of long-continued and egregious racial 
discrimination," but also made express findings as to several 
discriminatory acts that occurred within 300 days of the filing. 
The CA concluded that all of the claims were timely. ' 
These cases were held for the possibility that we would 
hold Title VII's timely filing requirements to be jurisdictional 
or that we would address the continuing violation theory in No. 
78-1545. Because we have held that timely filing is not a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit and have 
dismissed the writ of certiorari in No. 78-1545 as improvidently 
granted, I recommend denying the petitions in these cases. 
' I• 
LFP/vde 
January 12, 1982 
78-1545 ZIPS v. TWA 
80-951 INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDENTS v. 
TWA 
Justice Powell concurring in 78-1545 and concurring 
in the judgment in 80-951. 
The above cases arise out of the same protracted 
controversy, and the Court disposes of them in a single 
opinion. The only question in 78-1545 is whether the 
timely filing of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional 
prerequisite in bringing a Title VII suit. I agree that 
$ ~ 
it is not jurisdictional and i;r subject to waiver a~ 
•• 
estoppel. Accordingly, I join parts I and II of the 
Court's opinion. 
I join only the judgment in 80-951. My concern with 
the Court's opinion is that it does not make clear that a 
timely charge, as well as a violation of Title VII, is a 
prerequisite to disturbing rights under a bona fide 
seniority system protected by Section 703(h), 42 u.s.c. 
Section 2000 e-2(h). This was made clear in United 
Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 u.s. 553, 559 (1977), a case 
~ not cited in the Court's opinion. I nevertheless concur 
~ ~ ~ ...... ~.J-
in the remand of 80-951, ta-.5 app~;ou~fii a settlement ~r 
'\ 
~~ ,..-""'\ 
A awarding retroactive competitive- status seniority under 
the standard of Franks v. Bowman, 42 · u.s. 747 (1976). 
~ 
This case has been in litigation since 19~), and in --
3. 
view of its complexity it is difficult to be certain as to 
"what happened and when". I believe, however, that one 
can conclude that the requirements of Evans were met. 
In its order of October 15, 1976, the District Court 
found that timely charges had been filed for all class 
members. That order was appealed to the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit with the appeal of the October 18, 
1976, order which found that the defendant had 
discriminated against the entire plaintiff class. 
Although the October 18th order was affirmed, the Court of 
Appeals vacated the October 15th order, holding that the 
members of Subclass B had failed to meet the 
jurisdictional requirements of Title VII because they had 
not filed timely claims. But the mandate of the Court of 
Appeals never issued. Today, the Court reverses this 
aspect of the Court of Appeals' judgment. The October 15, 
1976, and October 18, 1976, orders of the District Court, 
finding timely charges and discrimination, are now final 
and intact. I therefore concur in the judgment of the 
Court affirming the award of retroactive competitive-
status seniority under the standard of Franks v. Bowman. 
January 22, 1982 Conference 
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List 3, Sheet 3 
No. 78-1545 
~ 
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES 
No. 80-951 
IND. FED. OF FLIGHT 
ATTENDANTS 
v. 
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES 
G-
I 
Motion of Petitioner in 
No. 80-951 for Leave to 
File a Supplemental« Brief 
after Argument 
(Same) 
SUMMARY: On December 2, the Court heard oral argument in these 
consolidated cases. Petr now moves for leave to file a supplemental 
brief after oral argument to apprise the Court of a Dec. 3, 1981 
en bane decision by the CA 5, United States v. City of Miami, No. 77-
--.._ 
1856. Petr appends a copy of that decision and advises that it 
addresses one of the issues of this case: whether a consent decree 
may be entered over the objection of a union whose contract rights 
are adversely affected thereby. 
DISCUSSION: The motion is 1n compliance with Rule 35.5 and 
\) 
should be granted. 
There is no response. 
l/19/82 Caldwell 
PJC J•&Pl4r 
Court ................... . ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
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